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ABSTRACT
An abstract of the dissertation of Terry William Van Allen for the Doctor of
Philosophy in Public Administration and Policy presented January 28 , 1994.
Title: The hnpact of Enterprise Zones on Employment
The objectives of this study are to investigate the impact of Enterprise Zones
(EZs) on the employment of zone residents in 14 states and 60 communities. The
author ’ s investigation constitutes the "first" national study to evaluate the employment
impacts on zone residents. (A comparative , supplemental , single case study on new
jobs for zone residents in Portland , Oregon has been added in Appendix B.)
The results show that the impact of EZs on decreasing the unemployment rates
of zone residents is si g: nificant. Also , the interventionist factors of length of time
since designation , type of incentives , and number of incentives are all si g: nificant
indicators of different performances between zones. The employer-based incentives
of property tax abatements and income tax credits are the types of incentives that are
significant. However , the descriptive factors of lar띠 use , population , and geographic
size are not significantly influential. On average , the predictive model shows that a
full-incentives package would result in an EZ decreasing unemployment to the level
of its surrounding community in just over ten years. (The supplemental single case

study also shows that the majority of new hires are zone residents.)
The major policy implications and recommendations from this study are:
(1) That a full-scale incentives package with employer-based property tax abatements

and income tax credits , along with other incentives ,

sho띠d

be implemented by all

state EZ programs; (2) That more economic incentives should be developed at the
federallevel to enhance state EZ programs; (3) That more targeted areas should be
designated as EZs by the federal program , and that all states should enact targeted EZ
programs; (4) That annual unemployment data reports on EZs and their surrounding
communities should be mandated by the federal and state governments. (The major
recommendations from the supplemental single case study are that specific data should
be mandated and derived on new hires and zone residents for all EZ programs , and
that a formal job referral and training provider network should be provided for all EZ
programs.)
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CHAPTER I
BACKGROUND DEVELOPMENT AND THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

HISTORICAL CONTEXT
The Enterprise Zone (EZ) is a public-private cooperative policy tool for
targeting economic development incentives into specific geographical areas suffering
from economic distress or depression. Job creation and retention are primary goals
of an EZ program , along with greater entrepreneurship opportunities for zone
residents , and community improvements , such as redeveloping neighborhoods and
business districts , improving the infrastructure , and improving the safety and welfare
of local residents.
Great Britain and the United States
EZs were officially conceptualized as formidable public policy , instead of
merely academic theory , in a 1978 speech delivered in London ’ s depressed dockland
district by Sir Geoffrey Howe , member of Great Britain ’ s House of Commons , who
later became Chancellor of the Exchequer (equivalent to a Treasury Secretary) and
then Foreign Secretary in Margaret Thatcher’ s Conservative government. Howe had
taken the framework for EZs primarily from Peter Hall , Ph.D. , a British urban
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planning expert from Reading University and former chairman of the Fabian Society ,
based upon Hall ’ s analysis of the free port (no tariffs) and economic activity of the
British governed city-state of Hong Kong , with the idea of creating mini-Hong Kongs
within Britain’ s inner cities (S. Butler 1980 , 1981 , 1991; Hall 1991).
Howe ’ s elaboration of the EZ concept came directly after Sir Keith Joseph ,
another leading Conservative politician , announced at a conference arranged by the
Adam Smith Institute that when elected the next Conservative government would
establish a number of "demonstration zones."

Eventually , Britain adopted and

adapted its colony ’ s economic growth model in selected industrial areas by passing
EZ legislation under Mrs. Thatcher ’ s leadership as the Prime Minister.
designated zones were chiefly non-residential areas (Hall 199 1).

Britain ’s

Elsewhere ,

variations of Hong Kongs ’ enterprise development activities have been utilized as
Export Processing Zones (EPZs) in many Third World countries , that is to a large
extent in East Asia and to a small extent in Latin America (Grunwald 1991).
The concept has evolved in America to provide primarily tax and financial
incentives , along with regulatory relief, to various economically depressed and
distressed areas in both urban and rural communities. Each EZ program is to serve
as an experimental or pilot program of targeted economic development and
entrepreneurship in forming a model for any others to adopt. The underlying feature
in Hall ’ s analysis is that government had either incrementally caused or exacerbated
urban blight by crea따19 barriers (most notably tax burdens , plus prohibitive
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regulatory and planning policies) to

피nder

the creation , retention , and expansion of

business , thereby resulting in increased unemployment. However unconscious in
intent, business districts and neighborhoods have declined , and population shifts have
accelerated due in part to governmental policies , thus causing shrinking tax bases and
swelling social problems.
There may be other societal causes than deleterious governmental p이icies that
contribute to urban blight. But government can elect to remove any unnecessary
barriers , such as heavy tax burdens , that it has contributed to poverty , unemployment ,
and especially , the urban flight of businesses and working/taxpaying residents (Moore
and Stansel 1993). That is why EZs have been conceived and widely applauded (and
widely criticized) as a grand experiment to remove governmental barriers , and
thereby creating a

"st뼈띠 us"

to economic activity and the reduction of

unemployment. Rural areas have been included in state legislation as well as the
more evident needs in urban areas. In large

paπ ，

EZs are a new initiative brought

about by the massive failure of previous governmental programs in using large
bureaucracies with massive spending and bureaucratic planning to respond effectively
to community blight (S. Butler 1980, 1981 , 1991; Hall 1991).
Subsequently after being conceived and proposed in Britain, Conservative
Congressman Jack Kemp from New York developed an expanded American version
of the EZ concept after studying an income tax incentive program that positively
affects Puerto Rico ’ s industries and after reviewing an edifying EZ position paper by
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The Heritage Foundation’s Stuart Butler, Ph.D. , which summarized Howe ’ s proposal.
Kemp led the charge and introduced a highly substantive EZ bill in congress (S.
Butler 1980, 1981 , 1991). Liberal Congressman Robert Garcia , representing the
decayed and blighted South Bronx of New York , endorsed this concept and cosponsored a new EZ bill with Kemp , and Liberal Congressman Charles Rangel ,
representing another well-renown slum area in New York ’ s Harlem district, provided
additional support. The 1981 Kemp-Garcia Enterprise Zone bill (H.R. 7563) came
onto the scene with both liberals and conservatives providing support (S. Butler 1981 ,
1991; Wolf 1989a).
Along with a bipartisan coalition in congress , additional support c없ne from the
Reagan Administration and other significant organizations , such as the congressional
Black Caucus , the National Urban League , the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People , and the National League of Cities (S. Butler 1991).
Much of the support in establishing EZs has come from state and federal legislators
who are minorities , since there are large concentrations of minorities in impoverished
areas with small business minority entrepreneurs who tend to hire minority employees
(Bates 1993). Additionally , minority communities with strong

minority-owned .s샌원l

business activities have produced residents who have higher rates of college
graduates , professionals , entrepreneurs , and incomes than minority communities with
weak minority-owned small business activity. In fact , minority entrepreneurs provide
community leadership with support for education , recreation , crime control , and all
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functions of a stable and prosperous community (1. Butler 1991).
Both

Bri디sh

and American liberals were disappointed in the poor results of

massive governmental expenditures , such as British and American versions of Urban
Renewal and Model Cities programs that only dislocated many of the poor (Butler
1981; Rothenberg 1967) , thus many liberals were attracted to a new governmental
initiative to help the needy. Both British and American conservatives were attracted
to limiting governmental spending programs and to stimulating the free market
opportunities within impoverished areas (S. Butler 1981 , 1991). There was a growing
sentiment that EZ incentives are a "tool ,"

따ld

this tool was a way to have incremental

and efficacious impact on reversing economic blight (Pierce 1986; Wolf 1989a,
1990).
Battles over turf by the U.S. Departments of Treasury , Commerce , and
Housing and Urban Development (Mellor 1987), along with resistance by key
legislative and executive officials (S. Butler 1991; Mellor 1987) , had stalled the
passing of any federal legislation until 1987 with the passage of Title VII (Enterprise
Zone Development) of the Housing and Community Development Act [Public Law
100-242].

However , this was merely a "symbolic" bill , in which the U.S.

Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) was deemed the appropriate
agency to administer the program (Wolf 1989). During 1988 another short delay
occurred before implementation , when administrative rules had to be ironed out. This
legislation authorized the Secretary of HUD to designate 100 severely distressed EZs
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across the nation.

Yet, the legislation lacked any tax and fmancial incentives ,

therefore it has lacked any significant impact (Erickson 때d Friedman 1991).
Differing views on any revenue losses that might occur by implementing
갱ubstantive"

federal legislation also significantly slowed the process (Butler 1983;

Kemp 1984) , and this debate has slowed any progress until recently , when the
overwhelming need for a substantive federal EZ program

be때ne

apparent in the

aftermath of the 1992 urban riots. Jack Kemp (1984) has strongly argued that there
cannot be significant revenue loss by providing incentives to where there is no or little
revenue production to begin with , and only revenue gain can result from broadening
the tax base by increasing jobs with greater capital gains and profits , where there
currently are few or none. Part of something (by stimulating production with tax rate
cuts) is better than all of nothing (by prohibiting production with high tax rate
barriers).

In fact , another budgetary benefit of increased economic activity and

employment

띠

EZs would be lower levels of public welfare expenditures and less

public dependency for local residents.
Rightly or wrongly , a perception of EZs resulting in significant revenue losses

and incentive costs prevailed by the leaders in congress during the 1980s , however
laudable the EZ goals of economic development. In light of the across-the-board
1981 Kemp-Roth tax cut, the 1981-82 recession (induced by previous inflation) , large
deficit spending , federalism , deregulation , sustained economic growth evidenced by
numerous positive indicators (i .e. , an increasing gross domestic/national product, a
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decreasing inflation rate , a decreasing interest rate , a decreasing poverty rate , and a
decreasing unemployment rate) after 1982 and throughout the remaining decade , and
ideological embattled congressional and executive branches , there seemed to be no
legislative will in the 1980s to add a targeted incentive program to the plate by
pus피ng

federal EZs forward.

Additionally , the 1986 Tax Reform Act decelerated momentum for any
mear파19ful

EZ

legisla다on ，

since a "tax neutral" position headed by President Ronald

Reagan on the new tax codes dominated the reform. Without a tax neutral position ,
there was little possibility for the greatly needed tax refonn , which was the Reagan
Administration’s priority.

Many tax loopholes for higher income levels were

removed , rates were lowered , and there was no political will to add tax incentives for
anyone , including the blighted communities (S. Butler 1991). Although , Reagan did
get congress to pass symbolic EZ legislation (as noted earlier) with the hope of 파띤댄
amendments adding economic incentives to the federal program.
Substarltive federal EZs appeared to be a good idea , whose time had not yet
come. Ultimately , it has taken over a decade , since a federal bill was first conceived
and proposed by Jack Kemp , for advocates of federal EZ legislation to

윈nally

gain

the momentum to raise EZs into one of the more important urban and economic
redevelopment issues in America.

8
State Programs
Contrary to the federallegislative logjam , legislation at the state level exploded
in the 1980s.

There were 37 states and the District of Columbia that fonned some

kind of EZ legislation in the 1980s , plus Nebraska was added to the list with 1992
legislation , which makes a total of38 states mandating over 3 ,000 EZ areas with each
state providing its own variety of state and local incentives. A

lis파19

of the states

and number of zones is given in Appendix A (U.S. Housing and Urban Development
1992).

California has legislated two distinct state programs. Quite different from

the other states , Mississippi and South Carolina have general rather than targeted EZ
legislation , and Maine has subsidized grants rather than tax and fmancial incentives
(Erickson

때d

Friedman 1991).

Currently , Maine , Minnesota and Mississippi ended their EZ programs with
sunset provisions. However these states are expected to renew their EZ mandates.
New EZ programs have been proposed in many of the remaining 12 states without
current or previous legislation , so there could be a few more states with programs in
the near future. New , broad , and meaningful federal legislation could spur on new
state programs , as more and more states would want to be included in receiving
feder떠

incentives for their programs.
The statements of intent in state legislation or administrative descriptions show

that the majority of EZ programs specifically cite job creation as the most commonly
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stated priority. Specific references to health , safety , and welfare (as a group of goals)
are the next highest stated priority and are included in the statements of intent by
slightly less than half of the states. General statements of intent on neighborhood
revitalization , community development, and public-private collaboration are included
in some , but not in the majority of the states (Friedman 때d Erickson 1991).
The EZ programs for each of the states are as varied as the states themselves ,
which is seen as a positive to the subscribers of the experimental model approach of
EZs (Verstandig 1985). The states tend to have varied tax and fmancial incentive
packages. The most common incentives tend to be tax incentives , which include local
property tax abatements , state and local sales tax waivers , state and local income tax
credits for employers and/or employees , and state investment tax credits. Targeted
areas sometimes have fmancial provisions for state sponsored loans and/or for
industrial development bonds (IDBs). Although strongly advocated in the original
concept, the proposals for local regulatory relief, such as the waiving of prohibitive
local building and zoning laws , administrative procedures and red tape , and licensing
and fees , have never been widely implemented with any tenacity (Erickson

때d

Friedman 1991; U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 1988; Wolf
1990).
State programs are widely varied in the number of designation criteria , number
of designated zones , and number of incentives. Several states literally have hundreds
of EZs that have been designated in multitudinous rural and urban areas. Generally
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speaking , states with between 5-75 designated zones and with greater incentive
packages tend to have better success at economic development due to their highly
concentrated efforts. Those states with fewer than 5 designated zones tend to have
limited incentives and symbolic legislation.

States with a greater number of

designation criteria (in qualifying for zone status) tend to have a greater number of
incentives , which manifests a greater emphasis on the programs by the state
legislatures.

Thus , the state legislatures that give the most thought and care to a

quality EZ program tend to have more criteria to qualify for designation to limit the
number of zones and more incentives (both in quality and quantity) to give a
concentrated effort to increase economic activity (Erickson
Erickson

때d

때d

Friedman 1991;

Friedman 때d McCluskey 1989).

In an effort to be in line for future federal designation , many states have
written their bills with designation criteria that would be similar to potential federal
guidelines (Wolf 1989). Most notably , the criteria has conformed in the urban arena
to Urban Development Action Grant (UDAG) guidelines administered by HUD ,
which provides a formula based mainly on unemployment rates , poverty rates , and
population losses (Business Facilities 1988; Kemp 1984; U.S. Department ofHousing
and Urban Development 1988).
It is interesting to note in the United States that much of the West has been
slow to enact EZ legislation , although the Midwest and Southwest do have numerous
states with programs. Oregon is the only state in the Pacific Northwest to currently
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have EZ legislation. Most of the states mandating EZ programs are in the country ’ s
other regions. Many of these regions have experienced historical declines in labor
for industry and manufacturing , affecting large segments of their populations , which
have

res띠ted

in increased poverty , unemployment, and population shifts (S. Butler

1980, 1981; Erickson 때d Friedman 1991). This economic decline in many localities
within these regions has fostered EZ

progr，때IS.

Small Business
Small business is generally defmed as any business with the number of
employees ranging between 1-100 때d up to 500 when including medium-size business
(U.S. Congress 1992). Thus , the categorical description of small business actually
refers to "small-to-medium business" versus large-size business.
Since the vast majority of new jobs are created at the small business level (S.
Butler, 1991) , since the vast majority of entry and low skilled jobs are created at the
small business level (S. Butler 1980, 1981) , since old buildings provide lower costs
in space for a wide variety of small businesses (Jacobs 196 1), and since zone
residents can become employers as well as employees more easily in a small business
environment (Kemp 1984), state EZ legislation has often targeted incentives at small
business development. Although , all EZ programs in all states tend to vigorously
welcome major corporations. For the most part, taxes are far greater concerns to
small frrms and their survival than to

I따ge

corporations (Armey 1992; S. Butler
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1981; U.S. Congress 1992) , although tax incentives can greatly

e따lance

any size of

business--small , medium , or large.
Yet,

capi없I

is a primary concern of both start-up and expanding businesses.

Some argue that capital and fmance incentives for the first few years of a small
business venture are frequently more attractive than deductible income tax incentives ,
since a profit is very often not made in the first few years of a new small firm (S.
Butler 1982a).
Conversely , all businesses pay significant property taxes in the form of
property construction and ownership , or in lease and rental costs. Small businesses
tend to contract for leases , which include property tax assessments in tlle prices
required by owners who lease or rent out their buildings and properties. Sales taxes
for many small businesses are also significant in the first and subsequent years of a
new or expanding enterprise.
Many states opt for an incentive or a package of incentives that include small
businesses across-the-board (commercial , retail and service along with manufacturing ,
technological and industrial sectors) , but some states focus on incentives for one type
of business (such as manufacturing) as is done for the industrial parks of Great
Britain. When industry is targeted by the state EZ programs , then legislation tends
to provide incentives for medium and large-size businesses , as is the case in Oregon.
For instance , in contrast to the great emphasis on small business by many
states , Oregon EZ legislation has restrictive incentives and does not target small
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business , even though passage of legislation was lobbied by small business
associations , so medium and large-size companies have been the ones to chiefly (but
not exclusively) benefit from Oregon ’ s EZ programs.
Prooosed Federal Incentives
In the past, substantive federal tax and financial incentives have been proposed

to be combined with state incentives , but major federal incentives have never become
law , which will be discussed later. Major incentives at the federal level that have
been proposed are substantive capital gains tax reductions , investment tax credits ,
expensing waivers on stock purchases , and loan interest deductions. Other proposed
incentives are substantive federal income tax credits for employers and employees.
Between the various types of federal tax incentives , those that stimulate capital gains
and capital fonnation for employers are viewed as the most substantial for creating
jobs. It does not have quite as much impact to give a tax credit to prospective
employees if there are no or few job opportunities available to utilize the incentive.
Also , weak incentives and those incentives with onerous stipulations for employers
are viewed to have little impact on employment.
Several proposed packages of federallegislation have had a stronger emphasis
in the targeting of individuals (j obless) and groups (zone residents) through economic
incentives than most of the states. Federal income tax incentives have been proposed
for both employers and new employees--for employers hiring zone residents with an
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additional credit for hiring the unemployed , and for new employees who are zone
residents with an additional credit if they were unemployed. Since federal income tax
rates are larger than state and local income taxes , zone residents and the unemployed
can be better targeted with the larger federal income tax incentives , particularly in
form of capital gains tax reductions.
Other proposed federal EZ incentives for individuals or groups have included
social security tax credits for employees who were unemployed and for employers
hiring new employees who were unemployed. Federal welfare and health insurance
provisions have been proposed to be gradually or decrementally fazed out for new
employees , instead of new employees being immediately being cut off from public
health care assistance upon employment. Federal child day care credits have been
proposed for working parents. Finally , expanded federal job training credits have
also been proposed , as many employers find job training programs very attractive
(Butler 1982b; National Association of State Development Agencies 1985).

An

example of addressing the need for this last type of program is the North/Northeast
Portland , Oregon EZ program , which is a model for utilizing a very large job referral
and job training provider network (JOB-NET) , including the federal Job Training
Partnership Act (JTPA) program as a small component of the network (Appendix B).
Sodal and Business Goals
State and local EZ incentives have been aimed more at stimulating business
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and economic activity with the by-product resulting in serving many social needs ,
especially in the hiring of unemployed EZ residents. Some critics have declared a
dichotomy between social and business interests. However , state programs have
tended to blend the two , and have used business goals as the starting-point, due to the
types of economic incentives available , and social goals as the by-product.
Most of the state programs have incentives for businesses , while a few state
programs have incentives for individuals and groups (unemployed zone residents).
Due to the social philosophy and kinds of incentives available at the federallevel , the
targeting of individuals and groups have been given more emphasis in proposed
federal legislation.
Whether social needs are inherently met as a by-product of targeting business
and economic growth , or economic incentives are merely used as the means to target
specific social ends , both business and social impacts are goals of EZs (Kemp 1984).
In light of the recent urban riots , jobs and economic growth have been increasingly

seen as a great social need , thus "blending" business and social needs.
The recent urban riots brought into acute recognition that both the hope for and
experience of having a job or working in a career or succeeding as an entrepreneur ,
is an individual ’ s fundamental and greatest social need in every community. Former
HUD Secretary Kemp ’ s axiom is that people 血 not 쁘stroy either (1) that which they
own of value or (2) that in which they have an economic stake. Another common
axiom is that the best social program is a good job. These are the fmgerposts and
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postulates upon which people of widely diverse political views agree in their support
of substantive federal EZ programs being implemented in blighted areas.

Federal Le£!islation in the 1990s
The future of meaningful federal EZ legislation looked promising at the end
of the 1980s (Green 1990) , and then into the early 1990s based upon several facts:
(1) that the foremost advocate of EZs , Jack Kemp , has served as the Cabinet

Secretary for HUD and has well-articulated a great need for EZs; (2) that resistance
by key politicians has in fact been reversed to avid support (U.S. Representative
Daniel Rostenkowski , a long-term Democrat from Illinois who is chairman of the
House’ s Ways and Means Committee, is a case in point); (3) that several years have
passed since the last major tax

(neutr떠)

reform act; (4) that there have been numerous

success stories by many state programs; (5) that there are perceived failures in
previous governmental spending programs; and most importantly , (6) that there is a
growing demand for federal support to combine with state and local programs due to
the continued decay of a great many American cities.
This last point has been highlighted in the media coverage after the urban riots ,
especially those that occurred in South Central Los Angeles , in the spring of 1992.
Ironically , part of the South Central Los Angeles rioted area already has a state EZ
program , so this violent outburst of frustration and destruction has been a clarion call
for a new and greater federal initiative to be combined with the various state
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programs.
In the early 1990s , Congressman Rostenkowski proposed a bill with incentives

for a limited number (25) of federal EZs to support business creation and retention.
Congressman Rangel proposed an expanded bill with incentives for a greater number
(l 00) of federal EZs , plus he wanted to link in new and massive welfare services and

public expenditures for EZs (Tucker 1991). Neither bill had the legislative support
to pass on its own.
After the urban riots in the spring of 1992 , and in the climate of everincreasing blight in many urban and rural areas , along with ever-decreasing capital
formation

때d

investment in these areas , there was much support in both Houses of

congress for stimulating capital formation and investment through federally targeted
EZs. Although capital incentives are more controversial than labor incentives for the
U.S. Senate (U.S. Library of Congress 1992a) , capital gains tax exclusions and
investment credits on stock purchases were given the greatest emphases in policy
formation by the U.S. House of Representatives and Bush Administration with the
goal of unleashing venture capital provisions into these poverty areas (U.S. Library
of Congress 1992b). Capital formation is the greatest concern of entrepreneurs and
minority business owners (Wall Street Journal 1993). In the fall of 1992, the House ’s
version of an EZ bill was also passed by the Senate allowing for

capi때

provisions ,

but it was the various amendments contained in the overall bill that caused an
execu 다ve

veto. EZs accounted for only 10% of the spending in the overall bill.
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The most recent federal EZ legislation was passed during the summer of 1993 ,
which provided very few economic incentives (in comparison to the 1992 proposal)
for designated "empowerment zones" in poor communities. There are to be a total
of nine demonstration or empowerment zones (six urban and three rural), which will
receive some limited income tax incentives. An additional 95 enterprise communities
(65 urban and 30 rural) will be designated without any tax incentives. In addition ,
Indian Reservations were given some more community development provisions in this

bill.
The EZ package primarily has two provisions: (A) a small employer income
tax credit (20% ofthe first $15 ,000 per new employee who is an empowerment zone
resident until 2001 , then 15 % in 2002 , 10 % in 2003 , and 5 % in 2004) will be
available for the nine zones; and (B) modest portions of tax-exempt facility bonds
(maximums of $3 ,000 ,000 for anyone zone or community , and $20 ,000 ,000 for all
zones and communities) will be available for all designated areas.
The chief emphasis will be on expanding and streamlining block grant and
welfare programs with more federal versus local control , rather than on fmandal and
tax incentives for local initiatives and enterprises in indigent areas.
empowerment zones and enterprise communities will be

reg비ated

All of the

through a federal

Enterprise Board. This centrally-managed program will be implemented in 1994-95.
While Governor of Arkansas , President Clinton enacted state EZ legislation
and now he has enacted federal EZ provisions , however modest, in this recent
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legislation. He was able to get his overall legislative package passed , but with
enormous political arm-twisting due to the m째 or tax increases and budgetary spending
imbalances in the overall bill. The bill passed by a single vote in each house of
congress.
In addition to the empowerment zones and enterprise communities , there were

two narrow provisions relating to economic development, which were included in this
bill and can be applied to the zones and communities , as well as to all other areas.
These are: (A) capital gains tax exemptions at 50% for long term (5 years or more)
holdings on start-up businesses owned by minorities or the disadvantaged (but only
industrial or manufacturing businesses are eligible) , and (B) capital investment tax
credits for small businesses on the first $17 ,500 of new equipment acquisitions.
Clinton declared in principle during his first State of the Union Address to the
U.S. Congress that there should be community development banks in EZ areas.
Additionally , the House has passed a bill to provide funds through existing
commerciallenders , while the Senate has passed a bill to charter new single-mission
lenders. A negotiated agreement between both houses should be forthcoming in the
near future and it would represent another modest step toward eventually providing
meaningful and effective federal EZs.
In contrast to specific empowerment zones , it should be noted that the Clinton

Administration had previously proposed raising tax rates and cutting tax incentives
provided in Section 936 of the commonwealth laws.

A compromise policy was
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passed by congress , which retained much , but not all , of the tax provisions.
Ironically , the Clinton proposal could have reversed much of the economic
development for the indigent people of Puerto Rico by eliminating or curtailing the
incentives to American corporations , which made the island the technological
powerhouse of the Caribbean.

However , the Governor of Puerto Ri co could

implement new incentives for native companies , especially for small businesses ,
which are excessively taxed with ten times the capital gains corporate rate in
comparison to the large companies under Section 936. The important point is that the
unique provisions of Section 936 fall under a very broad defmition of an EZ program
and are the key factor in the commonwealth’ s economic development (Daubon

때d

Villamil 1991). Although , many of those who seek to eliminate the tax provisions ,
instead support statehood and full federal programs for Puerto Ri co.
In sum , it still may take several more years before substantive and expansive
EZ legislation is passed at the federal leve l. The new legislation should forestall any
passage of a substantive and expansive EZ program in the near future , while this
modest program is implemented and evaluated in the next few years.

However , the

underlying momentum to better address poverty issues in urban and rural areas
through large-scale economic empowerment, slowly and continuously gains in
strength. Continuous bipartisan support, ever-mounting and severe urban crises , and
renewed debates in future congressional and presidential elections could again raise
the issue of substantive and expansive (versus meager) EZs to heightened national
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attention. It is foreseeable that an evolutionary move beyond meager demonstration
zones to a substantive and expansive federal EZ program could result later in the
1990s.

RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

Puroose of the Studv
πIe

purpose of this study is to evaluate the impacts of state Enterprise Zones

on unemployment throughout the nation.

There appears to be few studies on the

"results" of EZs (Green 1990). Since 1985 , the May issue of Business Facilities
magazine has provided a "feature" on updated results on the growing number ofjobs ,
businesses , and invest:ment dollars in EZs. HUD published a "ten case studies" report
in 1986 , which also gave positive reviews on the fiscal impacts (U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development 1986). But this study goes beyond previous fiscal
impact studies , and it contributes a quality national analysis on the unemployment
impacts of EZs.

The supplemental section in Appendix B was added to provide

another step forward in researching employment outcomes by analyzing specific job
hiring impacts in the North/Northeast Portland , Oregon EZ program.
Most of the literature is a theoretical discussion on these two issues: (1) why
or why not there should be EZs , and (2) what incentives should or
provided for EZs.

sho띠d

not be

Very little of the literature provides research on either the

outcomes of EZs or what causes these outcomes. This appears to be due to the fact
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that EZs were conceived in this country only a decade or so ago , and that most of the
debate has been in the justification for the creating or preventing of them. There is
a big gap in the literature on EZ employment outcomes and explanations for these
outcomes within the context of varying EZ incentives and programs.
Most studies within the states have been on fiscal
only one other

깨ational"

따lpacts

and there has been

study on EZs in the academic literature , and this was by

Rodney A. Erickson and Susan W. Friedman (along with Ri chard E. McCluskey) of
Pennsylvania State University (1 989) , which will discussed again in the Li terature
Review section of the next chapter.

But their study did not evaluate any EZ

employment impact specifically on zone residents , and the data gathered in 1985-86
on EZ programs by HUD (which was used in their study) was limited since most EZs
existed for only a few years , thus restricting any time series analysis.
This study is the 단rst national study on EZs ever to focus on "unemployment
impacts on zone residents over a period of time." Additionally , the supplemental
section in Appendix B is the 진잭t case study ever to focus on "employment outcomes
with actual numbers of jobs created versus actual numbers of zone residents hired."
This study along with the supplemental section will provide important analyses on the
area of EZ employment where there is a large gap in the published findings. It makes
a significant contribution to the field of knowledge , since EZs are still relatively new
and the emergence of data based on results is becoming increasingly possible to
collect. It will also serve as a formal report to the U.S. Department of Housing and
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Urban Development.
In sum , this study will have more data collected on EZ impacts for evaluation
m없1

earlier studies. It has a supplemental section of critical significance , and it

focuses on an important analysis for EZs , which is unemployment impacts and
employment outcomes.
Li st of Accomolished Obiectives

The following is a list of the six major research objectives that this study
accomplishes:
1. It is only the second national social science research study on EZs with a
broad scope of national significance having a cross-section of many states (and their
localities) in many regions , and it is the first to include locational differences between
the EZs.
2. It has an analysis on unemployment

ra않s

in regard to zone residents and

the surrounding communities , which has never before been researched within a
national scope.
3. It is the first study having the benefit of providing data results based on
many years throughout the 1980s , instead of a very short time frame as other studies
have used , which gives this

infi빠

field of research more substantial information for

evaluation and increased understanding.
4. It is one of only a handful of academic research studies on EZs , and is
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results-oriented in evaluating EZ 따lpacts， thus giving public policy formulation more
scientific input , which lifts the debate above merely philosophical , spec비ative ，
ideological , and political deliberation.
S. It contributes much needed research findings at a time when EZs are a
significant public policy issue at the federal leve l.
6. It includes a supplemental section that takes a crucial step forward with
greater precision in

de파파19

specific employment outcomes for zone and local

residents with a case study analysis.

Scholarlv Inout
The author has discussed this study with seven highly respected EZ
researchers. These are: Stuart Butler, Ph.D. (The Heritage Foundation) , Michael
Brintnall , Ph.D. (American Political Science Association) ,

Ro따ley

Erickson , Ph.D.

(Pennsylvania State University) , Roy Green (U.S. General Accounting Office) ,
Marilyn Marks Rubin , Ph.D. (City University of New York) , and Michael Wolf,
Ph.D. (University of Ri chmond).
All have unanimously stated that this national study and the supplemental
single case study in Appendix B make major contributions to the field , especially in
pointing out what EZ elements need to be researched further.

The debate is

extremely vicious between proponents and opponents as well as between factious
proponents of EZs , especially on the specific benefits to zone residents. It is for this
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reason and for the fact that the national study has some measurement imprecisions in
regard to unemployment calculations , that the author is providing a supplemental
section on an essential element of a case study in Appendix B, which presents detailed
information on employment for "zone residents" in North/Northeast Portland ,
Oregon.

While the national study lends itself to a more sophisticated statistical

methodology in analyzing general employment outcomes , the supplemental case study
provides an advanced step in the detailed analysis of zone residents and employment
outcomes for a specific EZ. The author is also a resident of Portland , Oregon , which
makes the fmdings of the supplemental section to be of particular interest.

CHAPTER II
THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
ECONOMIC THEORIES
There are three main components of economic theories which are the

foundation of EZs and increasing employment. These theories and components are
(1) microeconomic theory , with an emphasis on production costs and prices , as well
as capital fmancing and budgeting (price theory and managerial economic theory are
major subcomponents of microeconomics); (2) supply-side economic theory , with an
emphasis on stimulating economic growth through fiscal policy incentives for
production (while stimulating consumption , which is the demand-side , as a by-product
of stimulating production); and (3) urban economic theory , with an emphasis on
loca디on，

choice , mobility , and community (which also applies to rural areas). Some

components of these three theories will overlap.
Microeconomics
The first theory , microeconomics , has elements based upon the firm ’ s costs of
production , optimal prices , marginal profits , capital assets , and the demand of the
product (Mansfield 1990; Nicholson 1992; Watson 1991). Lower production costs
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cause lower prices , lower prices cause greater demand , and greater demand causes
greater production , including increased labor. Also , greater productivity and lower
prices create greater profit margins , and greater profit margins cause business
crea디on ， exp없lSion ，

and retention, which positively impact the demand for labor.

The costs of production within "general price theory" may include costs from
four general categories: (1) taxes , licensing , and fees; (2) property construction ,
expansion , renovation , purchasing or leasing; (3) equipment, inventory , operating
expenses , and miscellaneous overhead expenses; and (4) the price and productivity
of labor. This is compared to the prices of goods sold or services rendered , which
determine profits. Assets (including profit and 띠1 forms of capital) and liabilities
(including taxes , fees , and regulatory burdens with production costs) are the bottom
line factors in the "managerial economic decision-making" of prices and production
(including labor) , and in the creation , expansion , and longevity of business ventures.
Taxes are an important factor for small and medium-size business in
determining the prices of products and marginal profits , and ultimately in determining
the creation and retention of jobs (S. Butler 1981).

Property taxes tend to be a

substantial amount of tax liability for businesses , but other state

s허es

and income

taxes (along with federal income taxes) playa substantial role in tax liability and the
costs of doing business. Property taxes reflected in property ownership or leasing
costs are especially evident as a liability for new small businesses , as they cut across
all types of businesses.

Sales taxes apply chiefly to retail , although equipment
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purchases can play a role in this area.

Income taxes apply to businesses and

entrepreneurial occupations that make a profit, which often does not occur in the first
few years of a newly created or expanded small business

venturε.

Capital gains taxes

apply to investment for small companies as well as for medium-to-Iarge companies.
With the exception of capital gains taxes , large businesses tend to not place as much
emphasis on tax structures as do small businesses , due to other issues playing major
roles in gaining access to larger and more distant markets. However, large high
technology firms have tended to place the local and state tax structures as a higher
priority than other large firms.
Microeconomic theory includes capital as an essential factor to business
creation , expansion , and retention. ’The reduction of the costs of capital fmancing
allows for venture capitalists to invest in and unleash capital into zone businesses.
It also allows for employers and managers to make better economic decisions and to
gain greater profits. The emphasis on excluding all or part of capital gains taxes ,
along with both stock and capital investment credits , emerged as the most significant
factor in proposed federal legislation immediately following the recent urban riots.
Now , a new emphasis on the creation of community development or governmentaided banks to provide low-interest guaranteed loans to impoverished areas has been
added to this list in the quest for capital

forma디on.

Also , a renewed proposal to

enhance capital formation has emerged by lowering the cost of capital by allowing for
inflation-adjusted depreciation for equipment. The present cost and future return of
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capital budgeting cannot be overlooked and is a major factor in the development and
success of business.
In sum , decreasing the costs of production 때d capital increases the opportunity

for greater production at the optimum price. This will lead to increased production
and labor , although some increased productivity can occur through investing the cost
savings in improved technology. Therefore , increased employment is a distinct result
of the decreased costs of production , as well as a result of decreased costs in capital
financing and budgeting. The purpose of EZs is to target a mandate for increasing
the firm’s rate of return and marginal price by decreasing the costs of production and
capital , in highly unproductive localities , which will be an incentive for the increase
in production and employment.
Sunnlv-side Economics
The second theory , supply-side economics , is based upon increasing the
incen디ves

for production and capital (formation and earnings) , which will stimulate

"economic growth ," and is primarily accomplished through fiscal and tax policy
(Roberts 1983;

W없miski

1989). (Supply-side economics also emphasizes a stable

monetary policy based on an international commodity-price standard.) The fiscal
emphasis is on entrepreneurship

없띠

productivity whereby greater production and

investment are rewarded with greater profit , since the costs of both production and
capital are reduced and the profit margin increased when tax rates are reduced. By
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reducing the costs for production and

capi띠1 ，

productivity and investment for the firm.

there is an incentive for greater

This combined production and capital

(formation and earnings) stimulus results in greater profits for the firm and greater
employment for individuals. Additionally , a supply-side stimulus provides greater
means and rewards for the development of new technologies and better products
(goods and services) by the entrepreneur.
This production

없ld

capital (income gains) stimulus can

떠so

apply to an

individual by reducing income and other taxes , and thereby increasing after-tax
rewards and take-home pay , as an incentive for higher earnings and longer hours.
까피 s

can also aid in increasing labor force participation (LFP) by making it more

attractive to rise out 한om the welfare roll (Murray 1984).
In essence , a supply-side stimulus is based on the effects of the "marginal tax

rate." In practice, this means that steeply ascending tax rates discourage productivity
for the investor, employer , and employee , as additional dollars earned result in
smaller percentages of after-tax rewards and take-home pay. Thus , lower and flatter
tax rates encourage economic growth at both the micro and macro levels.
’The costs of doing business include the costs that government places on free

enterprise through taxes (and regulation). Governmental costs on both employer and
employee are disincentives to production. Governmental costs reduce both employer
and employee net incomes. Supply-side economists or supply-siders refer to this
before-tax and after-tax equation as the "tax wedge." ’The supply-side modus is to
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reduce the governmental costs of the investor risking his capital , of the employer
doing business , and of the employee performing work , which will increase
productivity and the demand for increased labor. Therefore , the creation , expansion ,
and retention of businesses and their employees are influenced by the incentives and
disincentives of production and profit.
Profit margins are substantially affected by taxes and regulations , especially
for small-to-medium businesses. A recent study by the Joint Economic Committee
of the U.S. Congress shows a direct, simultaneous , major, and inverse relationship
between governmental burdens (taxes and regulations) and the profits of small-tomedium business (Anney 1992; U.S. Congress 1992).

This congressional study

shows clearly that--the greater are the governmental burdens , then the lesser are the
profits for business , thus affecting productivity , labor , and employment.

Another

important and recent study (Vedder and Gallaway 1992 , 1993) confirms this report
and shows that regulations affecting wages and productivity costs have inversely ,
greatly , and historically impacted employment.
In the case of EZs , most of the supply-side incentives at the state level have

been targeted toward business with a goal of job creation and retention. Although
viewed with importance for rewarding individual initiative , tax incentives for
individuals are not as effective if there are no jobs for unemployed or underemployed
individuals to seek and obtain. Some of the most recent federallegislative proposals
have followed this line of supply-side reasoning with the following prioritized capital
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and production incentives: (1) capital gains tax credits for investors or employers ,
(2) stock investment credits for investors , (3) capital investment tax credits for
employers , (4) income tax credits for employers , and lastly , (5) income tax credits
for employees (Waltzman 1992).

The Laffer Curve
A trade-off and comparison between tax rates and revenues constitute the
foundation of supply-side theory on economic growth and government revenue.
When illustrated as a slope on a graph (see Figure I on page 33) , it is known as the
"Laffer Curve" (conceived by Arthur B. Laffer). As you can see , a tax rate of 100%
(with no incentive to invest, earn , and work , except in a black market economy) and
a tax rate of 0% (with no public collection of income) will both produce "zero" tax
revenue and an anarchic state. As the top rate of 100% drops , there is more and
more incentive to invest, earn , and work; and on the other end , as the bottom rate of
0% rises , there is more tax revenue generated , that is , un디I the tax rate rises too
high. When the tax rate rises too high , then there is less incentive to invest, earn ,
and work. Therefore , less tax revenue is generated than would be the case ifthe tax
rate were lower (see points" A" and "C" in Figure 1). Supply-siders have described
this economic growth policy as "revenue enhancing tax cuts."
With the exception of the optimal point, there is always a state of equipollence
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FIGURE 1
THE LAFFER CURVE
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where both a higher tax rate (which causes decreased economic growth and a smaller
tax base) and a lower tax rate (which causes increased economic growth 따ld a larger
tax base) will generate the "same" tax revenue on a long tenn basis (see points"A"
and "B" in Figure 1). Thus , a public policy can attain the same level of government
income , while promoting economic growth and prosperity in the private economy by
reducing high tax rates.
The .QI2다팩 l 앨i끄! (see point "C" in Figure 1) is where a specific tax rate will
produce the greatest 뇨많 댈쁘 tax revenue , but this specific tax rate cannot be either
excessively high or low to do so. This optimal point is not necessarily fixed at the
mid-point, but it is a

"rela디ve

range" based upon human action and behavior.

Experience shows it is a range , when including "total taxation" from

와1

levels of

government, that is measurablv , consistentlv, 웰a 쁘빌l 뾰뇨w 따료 mid-nointOverall, the basic premise of supply-side theory is that a lower tax rate will
produce the same tax revenue as a higher tax rate , by stimulating more economic
growth , employment and productivity , and therefore , a larger tax base and a healthier
economy (with more production

crea따19

more consumption

때d

savings).

The

reduction of excessive regulation also produces similar positive results as does the
reduction of excessive taxation. Thus , reduced tax rates and regulations are much
more desirable and beneficial to society. In sum , the "Laffer Curve" directlyapplies
to the high policy goal of EZs to have maximal benefits at minimal costs.
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ProductioR Versus Consumotion Policies
Supply-side economics focusses on the "production" element of economic
activity , whereas demand-side economics focusses on the "consumption" element of
economic

ac디vity.

Many governmental programs have focussed on the demand or

consumption mode , with transfer or entitlement payments to welfare recipients , as
well as grant funding for urban renewal. An increase in consumer spending actually
me때s

an increase in demand for products and services.

To some degree ,

governmental programs have been formulated for consumption in an effort to
stimulate more business activity

따띠

jobs , but have not proved satisfactory.

Since a more demand-side or consumption-driven model has been utilized in
government programs from the 1960s to today , and since there has been a
disappointing result amongst the minds of policy-makers with these programs , a
supply-side or production-driven model is gaining in momentum and is being tried by
over three-fourths of the states in the context of the EZ experiment. In sum , the
i끄댄낀다쁘

approach for stimulating production , including employment, is the basis of

the supply-side theory , in which EZs are a microcosm for this model. This model
is to stimulate business ownership as well as job creation and retention for zone
residents.
Both sides of the economic

equa디on 따e

important, supply and demand ,

production and consumption. In a free market system , supply-side economic activity
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increases production, with the by-product resulting in increased jobs , business and
home ownership , and overall consumption.

Unfortunately , previous and current

governmental programs have aided consumption without greatly impacting job
creation and retention for the poor. Public social programs exist to redistribute
consumption and do not have entrepreneurial incentives for greatly increasing
production in impoverished areas.
Now , EZs are being established to directly provide incentives for greater
production , which means greater job creation and retention for zone residents. Greater
production in EZs and its multiplier effects will meet and increase the demand for the
consumption of local goods and services. Greater production in EZs will aid in the
stimulation of new opportunities of entrepreneurship ,

없ld

business , property , and

home ownership for zone residents in their communities.
Urban Economics
The third theory , urban economics , has two primary components of spatial
dimensions , one is based on distance and the other is based on non-distance (Hirsch
1984).

πlis tr따lslates

into location decisions for both producers and consumers.

Some of the factors influencing business location decisions can be determined by
applying microeconomic and supply side economic principles to profit margins ,
prices , and the costs of production, which were discussed in the previous sections.
Other factors influencing both production and consumption , such as consumer choice ,
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access to markets , community identity and infrastructure , and crime , will be discussed
in this section.
Tiebout HvDothesis
There is a principle that differing or varying taxes between areas can

major economic

따lpact

뼈ve

a

on business location , job location , and residential location

based on "consumer choice." This means that having a lower tax in one community
that is adjacent to a community with a higher tax , will result in greater demand by
both communities for goods and/or services (due to lower prices) from the businesses
in the lower tax community , than they normally would with equal taxation. This
location theory is often described as "voting with one ’ s feet" or the "Tiebout
hypothesis" (formulated by Charles Tiebout) , where lower tax burdens are an
attraction for consumers and producers , and has accounted for some of the urban
flight (American Legislative Exchange Councill993; Hirsch 1984; Moore and Stansel
1993; Price-Waterhouse 1992).
There are other nongovernmental factors involved in consumer choices , but

this discussion centers on governmental factors.

For example , residents in

Vancouver , Washington (a high sales tax locality) will commute and purchase goods
across the river in Portland Oregon (a no sales tax locality) , with the results of
increased retail business activity in Portland and decreased retail business activity in
Vancouver. Due to the comparative advantage between tax systems , there are more
retail businesses and jobs in Portland φer capita) , and fewer retail businesses andjobs
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in Vancouver (per

capi따)，

even when comparing these localities to other cities

(Vedder 1993).
Portland residents who commute and purchase goods in Vancouver are given
a waiver of the sales tax , which serves as an incentive for retail business in
Vancouver. But this does not offset the transportation and location advantage ofretail
business in Portland for its residents. Additionally , industrial businesses that make
large purchases of equipment 때d supplies for production have an incentive to locate
in Portland with no sales tax. Yet, other comparative advantages , such as differing
property taxes , access to markets , and infrastructure , tend to influence the location
of these businesses as well.
’The location principle also applies to the residence

없ld

place of employment

where thousands of employees reside in Vancouver , due to lower property taxes and
housing costs , but work in the larger market place of Portland. In other words , this
is job location versus residential location. These Washington residents must pay
Oregon income taxes , yet they have a comparative advantage over their co-workers
who commute to work and are Oregon residents , due to the difference in property
taxes and housing costs.
Ironically , retail business has increased in Portland due to no sales taxes , while
residential housing has increased in Vancouver due to lower property taxes. Due to
the job location versus residential location , there is also a disparity in public revenue
where Oregon income taxes are paid by Washington residents. In sum , this urban
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economic location theory of comparative tax advantages having significant influence
on consumption and production applies to the EZ concept.
Mobilitv and Communitv
In regard to mobility and community , labor force mobility has always been a

key ingredient to a healthy economy , but opportunity and access to job markets and
high wages has been

파nited

in blighted areas , both urban and rural , where the poor

are concentrated (Sullivan 1990). There has been a debate between a "people to jobs"
approach and a "jobs to people" approach (Hansen 1991). This latter approach is
emphasized when a community and its cultural history are viewed as important values
for community residents.

People have established histories and

iden디디es

in

communities , and the limitations of mobility and opportunity for indigent community
residents compound the need to support the community , thus the inception ofEZs (S.
Butler 1981). A sound and mixed community has social , residential , educational ,
commercial, and industrial components in its identity (Jacobs 1961).

The EZ

program has been established to help meet the diverse needs of this urban economic
reality.
There have been numerous articles written

피

the 1970s ,

따띠

early 1980s ,

suggesting a public policy of urban "planned shrinkage" and "orderly disinvestment"
and "planned abandonment" in an effort to facilitate the decreased economic

ac디vity

in urban areas (S. Butler 1981). Some ofthese articles have even suggested that we
should develop a European model for providing large-scale governmental subsidies
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for mobility , but a modified structure already exists in America. Federal income tax
deductions already exist for moving expenses to new jobs and various polls cite that
the average American moves to a new residence every 4-5

ye따s.

’The enormous

explosion of automobile ownership and moving van businesses , the existence of
previously built roads and highways , the availability of air transportation , and the
quick access of communication all contribute to a very mobile society. However , the
urban poor have not been able to take full advantage of this impressive technology.
The poor cannot afford moving expenses and do not have the job skills where their
employment is highly demanded. Moreover, companies do not usually pay moving
expenses for unskilled and entry level labor. So , for these reasons and for their
established identities in communities , the urban poor have a great need for businesses ,
jobs , and entrepreneurial opportunities to be created and retained in their localities.
This phenomenon of the lack of mobility also applies to the rural poor.
There is another urban economic or community development theory that public

infrastructure and services can improve the economic plight of blighted areas (Mills
1987). For example , the building and maintaining ofthe tr때sporta디on infrastructure
(such as roads , bridges , and ports) can enhance the access to business markets for
employers and to job markets for employees. Implementing better education and
training programs , improving crime prevention with community policing , and
expanding youth recreation programs are other examples that have been widely
discussed in the media by poli디ci따IS and political 뻐alysts ，

especi 외ly

after the recent
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urban riots.
C찌me

and Communitv Develonment

However , the violence , pillaging , and destruc디on of the urban riots sent
another message as well as one of perceived societal injustice. These disorderly ,
unlawful , and destructive acts illustrated the fact that high crime rates are great costs
to local businesses and negatively

a댔다

local entrepreneurship and employment.

High levels of crime drive out existing business and hinder new business , both
directly and indirectly.

Higher insurance premiums , more security costs , more

inventory losses , more repair and maintenance costs , and less customer volume due
to personal safety concerns , are examples of crime ’ s negative affect on business.
Crime-generated obstacles , along with the normal and high financial risks of any
business venture , are strong disincentives to new businesses and frequently cause
economic 띠ilure in exis따19 businesses. Thus , governmental enforcement of jus디ce ，
law , and order in the community is essential to economic opportunity and prosperity.
On one hand , there appears to be a direct relationship of crime causing or
exacerba띠19

economic decay in communities , and on the other hand , there seems to

be marked exceptions to the thesis that poverty causes crime , with many anomalies
in soci이ogical and criminological studies and findings (Rubenstein 1992) , such as low
crime rates for the urban poor of Chinatown in the 1960s , the rural poor of West
Virginia , 파학꾀웰 male adults in poor communities , and the Great Depression. But
a central indicator of both crime and poverty in recent decades , especially for
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teenagers and children , is family stability versus family instability evidenced by "twoparent versus father-absent families" (Zinsmeister 1992).
Father-present f:뻐ilies have fewer emotional and behavioral problems , fewer
juvenile delinquents , fewer teenage pregnancies , fewer high school drop outs , fewer
gang members , lower rates of drug abuse , lower rates of welfare dependency , and
lower criminal rates for adults than father-absent families (Zinsmeister 1992).
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may show an indirect relationship of poverty impacting crime and other social
problems , 빼s 띠삐c않e it is "
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father-absent families. However , poverty ’ s impact on family instability and crime is
greatest when there is a lack of moral fiber in a culture or sub-culture (Davies 1992;
Hertzel and Hughes 1987; Stack 1983).

This chapter’ s primary emphasis on

economics does not discount the importance of non-economic factors , such as moral
and spiritual values to family stability , 띠aracter building , constructive and productive
citizenship , and lawful conduct. Non-economic factors will be discussed again later
in this chapter.
Therefore , the most common attraction for establishing EZs and to produce
more jobs and economic development, is the high goal of an improved community ,
i. e. , greater family stability , greater neighborhood and business district tranquility ,

less governmental and welfare dependency , less crime perpetrated against citizens and
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local businesses , higher quali디es of life , and greater economic empowerment for local
residents.

The ultimate attraction of EZs is the great need for an economic

development program whereby communities can be incrementally revitalized and can
be largely built from

w파in.

In sum , the components of the aforesaid economic theories , involving (1) a

firm ’ s costs , prices , profits , labor , and capital , (2) supply-side or production stimuli
through fiscal policy incentives , and (3) location decisions plus mobility and
community factors , as the bases for utilizing economic principles for improving
impoverished areas , lead to the fundamental point that EZs are a redevelopment
program.

Large-scale economic development in recent decades has occurred in

suburbs and has fostered urban sprawl , due to economic opportunities and social
realities.

Thus , the EZ program ’ s targeted goal is to "redevelop" blighted areas in

inner cities and outer rural areas through economic revitalization , which will
progressively "empower" local residents.

CRITICISMS

Zero Sum Economics
Criticisms of zero sum economics naturally arise from a discussion on
redevelopment and economic expansion.

Zero sum economic theory and the

redistributive division of an economic pie are not the primary building blocks of n파료
EZ theory , however much is said or done to the contrary. Many of the cIitics of EZs
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have an element of zero sum economic theory (where some individuals , groups , and
businesses will be the winners at the expense of others , who as a consequence will
be the losers) instead of a growing economic pie in their arguments. Those who do
not trust business believe that targeted tax incentives will allow businesses to exploit
the system

없ld

to make inequitable choices.

While those who do not trust

government believe that targeted tax incentives will allow politici 없lS， bureaucrats , and
special interest groups to cause inefficient and ineffectual choices.
Much of the zero sum criticism is rooted in a fear of a "donut effect" for both
businesses and individuals.

For businesses , this means that those firms located

directly outside will gain by relocating to inside of the zone , thus causing the zone
businesses to lose out on customers while relocating businesses take over the market
share. For individuals , this means that those individuals residing directly outside will
be 피red inside of the zone , thus causing the immediate surrounding residents to gain
and the zone residents to lose out on jobs. But EZ theory proposes to (1) primarily
create and expand businesses inside of the zone , and secondarily to attract the
relocation of

exis디ng

firms from outside of the zone; and (2) primarily create new

jobs and entrepreneurial opportunities for individuals residing inside of the zone , and
secondarily to serve as a job market for individuals residing outside of the zone.
Thus , the direct benefits to EZ businesses and residents are primary , while the
spillover effects for businesses and residents in the community at large are secondary.
In an empirical response to the concerns about benefits to businesses outside ,
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and not 피side， ofthe EZ , a previous EZ study by Elling and Sheldon (1 991) on four
midwestern states with 47 zones addressed the issue of business relocation.

El파19

and Sheldon found that for EZ activity (A) new businesses occurred between a 2131 % proportion , (B) expanding businesses occurred between a 55-66 % proportion ,
and (C) relocatin e: businesses occurred between a 7-16 % proportion. Since business
relocation is much lower than the other types of business growth activities , excessive
relocation or zero sum activity appears to not be a legitimate policy fear in regard to
EZs.

(Although , states are tempted to compete for the location or relocation of

medium-to-Iarge businesses in their zones in 때 effort to create many jobs with quick
swoops.) This important study by

E피ng

and Sheldon

w피

be cited again along with

other noteworthy studies in the Literature Review section of this chapter.
In an empirical response to the concerns about benefits to those individuals

outside , and not

띠side ，

of the EZ , this national research study and the supplemental

case study in Appendix B address the question of employment for zone residents.
The author’ s single case study in Appendix B gives substantive evidence that the vast

majority of new hires are zone residents.

Preferential Treatment and Benefit-Cost
The are many diverse criticisms espoused by opponents of EZs , but the
common thread of many of these criticisms , is the perception of "preferen디al
treatment" for things which these cri다cs passionately oppose. These critics can be
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generally categorized into the following groups:
1.

Critics who are pro-government (with socialist

incl피때 ons)

and anti-

business tend to perceive that certain businesses will be given preferential treatment,
which they neither need nor deserve , and will exploit an EZ incentive policy for selfinterest. These critics tend to believe that government should raise or maintain tax
rates , and oppose the idea ofutilizing tax incentives for any purposes , even economic
growth. They believe that government and business are in a pola단Z벌 conflict over
resources and values in society.
2.

Critics who are pro-business (with libertarian

government tend to perceive that government

w피

inclina디ons)

and

때ti

pick winners and losers through

redistribution schemes and the preferential treatment of special interest groups , which
will do more overall harm to society

th따1

good. These critics tend to believe that

imposed choices by government are inefficient and ineffectual , and are contrary to
those that result 댄파뭘~ in a market system with free choice available to all citizens.
Adding more public welfare supplements to EZ programs , which a few "big
government" politicians have proposed , is also onerous to them. They also believe
in a polarized conflict between business and government, especially due to the
regulatory and redistributive policies of a governmental leviathan.
3. Critics who are both pro-government (with

파g

government inclinations)

and pro-business (with Qig business inclinations) tend to believe that individuals and
groups (zone residents and

sm와I

businesses) will receive preferential treatment, thus

47
dil뻐19

the energies and abili디es of major ins뼈다ons ， which are large-scale

governmental programs and medium-to-large corporations , to be the chief comerstones of economic growth. (In contrast, there are a few supporters of EZs , who
would design EZ policy with these views in mind through major programs of targeted
infrastructure rebuilding and targeted corporate incentives , as the only way to make
a major impact on economic growth in targeted areas.)
4. Critics who focus mainly on costs can be aggregated together from all of
the above , because , no matter of ideology , all critics tend to argue that the costs
쁘댄략g뇨

the benefits of EZs , even though most of these arguments rely on political

reasoning or policy preferences rather than on empirical evidence. Some of these
opponents cite the loss of public revenue and increase of the federal budget deficit,
even if these claims are not supported by any proof. (Although , this modus of using
selective rationalization rather than credible facts can apply to both sides of any issue ,
which makes this empirical study most valuable.)
Previous sections have already addressed the issues raised by these critics. In
a nutshell , EZs are a public-private cooperative policy tool that utilizes free market
principles to target economic and social needs by creating jobs and entrepreneurial
opportunities in blighted communities , which empower citizens to lead a productive
life and to overcome a dependency on costly public programs.

In this way ,

government and business become 떠lies not enemies; free market incentives are
utilized to stimulate economic growth 없ld production and capital investment, while
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shunning zero sum win-lose community development schemes; the needy are provided
with economic opportunities and can rise above welfare dependency; small
entrepreneurial business is given the 갱reen light" through incentives to continue to
be the greatest entry level job creator in the country; and the tax base is broadened
into areas where little tax revenue collection currently exists.
Additionally , in 때 empirical response to the benefit-cost criticism , a scholarly
study by Marilyn Marks Rubin (1 990 , 1991) , plus Rubin 때d Trawinski (1 99 1),
produced a benefit-cost analysis involving 976 Urban Enterprise Zone (UEZ) firms
in New Jersey.

Rubin found that EZs , with a modest multiplier effect, have a

positive benefit-cost ratio of 1. 9 to I , or almost two to one for public revenues versus
expenditures. Without any multiplier effect, EZs were stilllow in costs compared to
other economic development programs. However, the conclusions of this important
study by Rubin should be tempered due to methodologicallimitations , but it will be
cited again , along with other noteworthy studies , in the Literature Review of this
chapter.

Non-economic Factors
EZs are based upon economic principles , but non-economic factors need to be
included to help put economic factors into perspective.

EZs have been mildly

criticized by those who see them addressing only economic issues and point to the
great need of improving values in morally debilitated communities , especi따Iy in the
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rearing of families. (The harsh debates by opponents and proponents on the merits
and demerits of EZs are chiefly on economic issues as noted earlier.)
Virtuous values can influence or determine such things as family stability ,
honest 띠aracter， good citizenship , personal and civic responsibility , and lawful and
orderly conduct. Moral and spiritual values appear to be a common denominator for
producing high levels of family stability 없ld low levels of crime (Davies 1992; Hertel
and Hughes 1987; Stack 1983) , and for establishing economic well-being. Virtuous
values can influence both the economic conditions and the work ethics of individuals ,
families , and communities.

Notwithstanding the deleterious economic effects of

cultural discrimination or personal limitation , the absence of moral and spiritual
values can determine economic hardship , while the presence of moral spiritual values
can determine the economic prosperity of

individu외s ，

families , and communities ,

which are the nuclei of a nation (Brookes 1982; Freeman 1986; Lowry 1993;
Reichley 1985).
On the flip side of the coin , economic prosperity can foster obsessive
consumerism , hedonism , and materialism , which are also destructive to society
(Davidson

때d

Rees-Mogg 1991). Thus , one could argue that virtuous values are

under attack when materialistic values , be they in the rich or poor, are the core of any
standards of living.
Non-economic conditions are more

qu떠itative

and intangible

th때

economic

conditions. Their primal importance should not be overlooked , but for the most part,
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EZs deal chiefly with economic conditions in assisting blighted communities. Again ,
EZs are not a panacea , but are a powerful policy tool to assist in the economic
empowerment of needy

n없nilies ，

so that they will be better enabled to mould and

elevate every aspect of their lives.

Empowered families are the expression of

productive individuals and the nuclei of productive communities. Virtuous values
have ascendancy over economic factors in the well-being of families , but economic
empowerment can help stabilize

far띠lies

so that virtuous values will have a greater

opportunity to flourish through wholesome home , church , school , recreational , and
civic ac디vi디es.

Family stability is much more than an economic condition , but

economic empowerment plays a fundamental role in generating hope and fulfillment
for families.

Economic Goals
A pure EZ policy is derived mainly upon the following seven goals of
economic growth , which balance out most of the arguments against an EZ policy
being implemented , by giving most policy-makers something to like about EZs:
1. EZs seek to eliminate governmental barriers to economic growth and to
remove an adversarial relationship between government and business.
2. EZs seek to target communities and citizens in economic depression and
distress.
3. EZs seek to utilize economic incentives to stimulate production through
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market principles instead of spending large amounts of governmental revenue on
boondoggles and welfare dependency.
4. EZs seek to stimulate small to medium-size businesses where most of the
new and entry level jobs , and entrepreneurial opportunities , are created.
5. EZs seek to stimulate economic growth and redevelopment from within ,

which will provide empowerment opportunities for zone residents within their
neighborhoods and business communities.
6. EZs seek to improve the overall quality of life for residents by improving

overall economic conditions for families and communities through jobs and
entrepreneurial opportunities.
7. EZs seek to broaden the tax base wide enough to produce greater benefits

than costs , thus

crea따19

a win-win combination for private development and public

finance.
There are gross variations of pure EZ theory where almost anything associated
with economic development is called an EZ program. This does give the cri디cs more
ammunition to point out flaws and failures. But this can also serve as rallying point
by advocates to illustrate the experimental nature of EZs where successful programs
can be adopted elsewhere and unsuccessful programs can be used as lessons of what
not to do.
In sum , the emotions of critics are very heated and strong due to their

economic perceptions of zero sum winners and losers , preferential treatments , and
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costs versus benefits associated with EZs.

Most of these arguments stem from

political ideology , which is something deeper than the mere argumentation about the
merits or demerits of EZs. The proponents of EZs seek to built a pluralistic coalition
with those of diverse political views , if not a consensus , by formulating a policy that
combines both business and social goals , and thereby cuts across the barriers of
politics and ideology. Many policy-makers agree that there is a great need for EZs ,
and that EZs are a new policy developed

잠om

previous economic successes and

failures , and that EZs may be the last available policy on economic redevelopment
remaining to be tried at the federal level.
illustrated the crisis state of existence
which demand action by

와I

없ld

Again, the recent urban riots have

public policy failures in blighted areas ,

policy-makers.

까피s

has given federal EZ policies ,

present and future , more momentum , as it usually takes an ongoing crisis , resulting
from or exacerbated by past policy failures , for polarized parties to agree on a new
policy ini디ative.

LITERATURE REVIEW
As noted earlier , there is much more to be learned about the results of EZs ,
as there have been only a small number of scholarly studies on EZs. The literature
is dominated by discussions on the theoretical merits

없ld

demerits of EZs.

This

literature review will summarize the major writings on both the intellectual roots and
the measured outcomes of EZs.
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There are two books that stand out as authoritative works on EZs. These two
books are actually the only books on EZs ever published in the United States. The
first book by Stuart Butler (1981) gives a thorough theoretical analysis for the creation
of EZs in the United States. Butler’s 디es to his native land , Great Britain, where the
concept originally took hold as formidable public policy , enabled him to improve and
develop an EZ concept for America through his policy analysis at a Washington-based
think 때ok ， The Heritage Foundation. In the late 1970s and early 1980s , Butler wrote

position papers , conducted seminars , published articles , and authored the book
Enterorise Zones:

Greenlinin l! the Inner Cities , all of which constituted the

intellectual roots of EZs in America.
The major themes of Butler’s analysis of economic

때uvenation

때d

redevelopment in blighted communities are--providing tax and financial incentives ,
easing and removing regulatory barriers , and targeting small businesses where job
growth and entrepreneurship have the greatest potential.

After completing his

monumental work on EZs , and wi!h the passage of time and the emergence of other
vital public policy issues , Butler has since formulated a new

na디onal

health care

policy , which , like his EZ analysis , is supported by many liberal and conservative
policy analysts. However, Butler is still recognized as a leading EZ authority , as
witnessed in an interview and policy debate published in a recent Wall Street Joumal
report on "Black Entrepreneurship" (February 19, 1993).
The second book is a collection of 따디cles and studies published in 1991 by

54

Sage Publications , entitled , Enterorise Zones:

New Directions in Economic

Develooment , and edited by Roy Green. Th e various chapters provide both policy
discussions and research results.

The intent of the book is to present scholarly

contributions by the leading policy analysts and academic researchers. Since many
of the writings on EZs have been done by politicians and journalists , and many of the
studies on EZs have been general fiscal studies by state agencies without utilizing
academic methodology , this book was intended to provide a single sch이arly resource
from the plethora of non-academic writings on the subject of EZs. Thus , a

dis따lct

well-reasoned and well-researched resource became available to new students of
public policy in the field of EZs. The book was not intended to be exhaustive , but
it was meant to highlight the leading academic thinking and findings on this particular
subject. In sum , the most significant EZ research studies and analyses ever published
are recapitulated by the authors in the Sage book.
The major themes presented in this important work are--that EZs are a tool and

not a panacea , that there are several empirical fmdings showing that EZs have
positive results in many cases with mixed results in other cases , and that there
remains much to be learned and more significant studies to be made on the subject
of EZs.
The first book by Butler covers the intellectual roots of EZs as the conception

of British

pI때피ng

expert, Peter Hall.

The second book by Sage Publications

provides a chapter on the intellectual roots written by Peter Hall himself. Both Butler
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and Hall describe the transition from academic theory to public policy in Great
Britain. Butler ’ s works provided the intellectual foundations for establishing EZs in
America coupled with lthe economic incentive policy initiatives of Jack Kemp. Other

countries either have adopted the Hong Kong model in part or have utilized incentive
based economic programs with varying and similar characteristics , but have done so
out of political and economical necessity , instead of arising from published scholarly
mput.
Maior Studies
The major studies on EZs in the United States have been mostly case studies
plus a few comparative studies of differing states and a national study. Although , the
number of major studies remain relatively few , these initial studies have addressed
important areas , which are (1) employment impacts , (2) benefits versus costs , (3)
relocation versus creation and expansion , and (4) evaluation of EZs.
Emolovment Imoacts
There are three major employment impact case studies that stand out in the
literature. Unfortunately , all three of these studies have methodological problems ,
but do offer some interesting efforts at

get따19

at some conclusions. However , the

poor methodology makes the prevailing conclusions of these studies unfounded , but
some of their findings , which are unaffected by their faulty fmal analyses , are of
interest.

One employment impact study is on Maryland , and the other two
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employment impact studies are on Illinois. It is worth noting that two of three major
employment impact studies published in the literature are on Illinois , even though
another study by Klemens (1 991) stated a need for more and better data to generate
any substantial evaluations and conclusions of the Illinois EZ program.
The study by Grasso and Crosse (1 991) was a study conducted by the U.S.

General Accounting

0채ce

(1 988) on three EZs in Maryland. Congressmen Kemp

and Garcia had requested this study of GAO , which is an arm of congress. The
purpose of the study was to analyze what effects federal
have on EZs if added to

exis따19

파댄파트

tax incentives would

state programs. Since 1982 , Maryland has had state

income tax incentives along with property tax incentives for EZs , so by reasons of
close proximity to Washington , D.C. , a long tenn program (compared to the average
state progr뻐1) ， and an income tax credit program , Maryland was chosen for this case
study.
The findings of the Maryland study were that employment impacts were not

statistically significant when businesses relocating to the EZs were eliminated from
the data base.

The reasoning was that these firms were not aware of the EZ

incentives when making their location decisions. This is faulty methodology for these
reasons:
1. The businesses that relocated into the EZs utilized the incentives after

locating in the EZs. Since this study was to evaluate the effectiveness of incentives ,
and not to determine the decision-making factors in business location , these businesses
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were separated out of the study without good cause. Additionally , it is very common
in most states for businesses to be unaware of EZ incentives , as they are not
extensively marketed by government officials.
2. Eliminating some of the valid data from relocated firms that represents a
significant number ofthe new jobs created in the EZs , especially jobs created through
the utilization of EZ incentives , is dubious at best.
3. There was statistical significance on employment impacts for all businesses
utilizing the EZ incentives , so it appears there was an effort to generate negative
results by using faulty criteria to separate out some of the positive results "after-thefac t." Thus , their original fmdings (but not final conclusions) are of great interest.
Another point worth noting is that since non-participating businesses were
included in the interviews and the data base , biases against the EZ program by nonparticipating businesses could have influenced the researchers decision on eliminating
valid data from the relocated firms that participated after their relocation.
The study by Redfield and McDonald (1 991) on the employment impacts of

EZs in lllinois found that not all businesses utilized the EZ incentives even when
eligible. There was about a 50-50 split between those businesses that do

때d

don't

utilize the incentives. The reasons for not utilizing the incentives by those eligible
businesses that did not, were shown by the following responses:

(A) 51 % were

unaware of the incentives , (B) 24% said it was not worth the 피ne and effort to go
through the red tape , and (C) 23 % felt the incentives were not relevant to them.
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The study found that employment impacts were not statistically significant.
Unfortunately , the methodology was weak because it incorrectly combined the results
of both participating and non-participating businesses in the use of EZ incentives in
the conclusion. They did this by including all investors , even those who did not
utilize EZ incentives. However, their fmdings do show that the firms utilizing the
incentives (1) had the great않t amount of investment , and (2) had created and retained
most of the jobs in the EZs. Thus , EZ employment impacts appear to be of relevance
by appropriately excluding those firms that did not utilize the EZ incentives.
Another study on Illinois by Esparza and

Willi때IS

(1 990) came up with the

same basic conclusion as Redfield and McDonald (1 991) of finding no statistical
significance on the employment impacts of EZs. Unfortunately , this study , as the
other, did not differentiate between firms utilizing EZ incentives and those not
utilizing EZ incentives. Again , the firms not utilizing EZ incentives skew any data
results in a negative direction when analyzing employment impacts. One noteworthy
comment on this last case study on employment impacts is that it had an ideological
undertone of dissuading Japanese investment in firms that are eligible for EZ
incentives in Illinois.
Ironically , these three employment impact studies have methodological
problems by reasons of faulty exclusion and inclusion. The Maryland study excludes
the relocating firms who have utilized the EZ incentives. The two Illinois studies
include all investing firms even when they have not utilized the EZ incentives.
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Contrary to their claims , these studies are not effectively measuring the employment
impacts of EZ incentives. So this methodological inaccuracy limits their usefulness
in developing effective public policies.
Also , a minor study worth noting (to add to the other three major studies) is
an employment impact analysis by B. M. Rubin and Wilder (1 989) , which was done
on Evansville , Indiana using a shift-share method.

πle

study concluded that outside

factors contributed to the job growth in the zone , more so than any factors inside the
zone , since job growth occurred in the region at-large. Unfortunately , this study only
analyzed a single zone while discussing EZ programs in general and failed to account
for the fact that unemployment dropped nationally and regionally

d뼈ng

the 1980s.

Benefits versus Costs
The most significant study on a benefit-cost or cost-benefit analysis was

authored by Marilyn Marks Rubin (1 990 , 1991) , plus Rubin and Trawinski (1 990) ,
for New Jersey ’ s Urban EZs as noted earlier. By including a moderate multiplier
effect, the costs run about $3 ,000 per job created , and $1.90 is generated in public
revenues as a benefit for every $1. 00 of tax incentive expended.

With a high

multiplier effect, the benefit ratio is $5.20 to $1. 00. With no multiplier effect, the
benefit ratio is $.70 to $1.00

피

direct public revenues. Thus , by including the total

direct and indirect benefits and costs , a positive 없lalysis is demonstrated. However ,
Rubin does point out that the substantial benefits of reduced welfare costs and other
public and community benefits , as well as any

sp피

over benefits and costs , are not
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included in the analysis.
Another noteworthy effort at conducting a benefit-cost analysis was the study
authored by Logan , Jf. and Barron (1 991) on EZs in Florida. Their study provides
a very positive result with a low cost of $520 per job created , and Florida’ s income
tax credit for corporations was the primary incentive utilized in the EZ program.
However , this study could be argued to be a fiscal-impact statement and not a fullfledged benefit-cost analysis , since it was not a scholarly study by academicians and
did not use sophisticated methodology.
Lastly , the study on Illinois by Redfield and McDonald (1991) concluded that
it was extremely difficult to gather sufficient data to conduct a benefit-cost analysis
along with their employment impact study , therefore the authors were unable to do
so.
Relocation versus Creation and Exoansion
There is one major comparative study (El파19 and Sheldon 1991) that stands
out on the question--does EZ business growth occur by firms that are created and
expanded from within, or by firms that relocate from the outside? As noted earlier ,
some of the debate on EZs is centered on the question if EZs are a tool for true
economic growth or just a zero sum game of insider winners and outside losers in the
location of businesses.

The important study by

E피ng

and Sheldon (1 991) , as noted earlier , analyzed

47 EZs in the midwest states of Illinois , Indiana , Kentucky , and Ohio. The results
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show that the majority of the new business activities in EZs are (A) by expansion of
existing firms at between 55-66 %; (B) by creation of new firms at between 21-31 %;
and (C) by relocation of outside firms to the

띠side

at between 7-16 %.

A minor study worth noting was one authored by Dabney (1 991) on eight
zones in eight states , which came up with the conclusion that EZ incentives have little
impact on the relocation decisions of firms. However, this study had a restrictive
scope as it did not distinguish any incen디ve influences on small versus large firms ,
nor did it account for the amount of development ac다vity that occurs through creation
and expansion.
Also worth noting was another minor study by Gusskind (1 990) , which
focussed primarily on Bloomington , lllinois and secondarily on Jersey City , New
Jersey. It concluded that most EZ firms have been attracted from the outside and are
not developed from within.
studies found.

πlis

is the opposite conclusion from what the other

Unfortunately , this study failed to account for the expansion of

existing firms , which is the greatest indicator for new business activity , and it only
considered newly created versus relocated firms. Thus , its conclusions are unreliable
due to excluding the fmns that actively expanded and represented much of the job
growth in the zones.
Lastly , the supplemental case study for Portland , Oregon in Appendix B gives

additional evidence that EZ incentives provide companies with an enhanced ability to
grow from within an EZ , and are not primarily used to attract companies from other

62
localities.

The evidence shows that all

participa따19

EZ companies have vastly

expanded , while none have relocated to the Portland EZ from other localities.
Pro e: ram Evaluation
There are three major contributions to the evaluation of EZs as a program.
All three studies emphasize entirely different aspects of the EZ program.
landmark study by Erickson

때d

The

Friedman (1 990 , 1991) emphasized (1) the number

and kind of incentives for the zones , (2) the number of zones in each state , (3) the
number of designation criteria for zones in each state , and (4) the number of new jobs
created in the zones correlated with many variables.
The conclusion by the authors is that the states concentrating their efforts on

a few zones with
incen디ves ，

grea않r

designation

c더te더a

and greater amounts of economic

tend to "create more new jobs" th없1 states mandating dozens of zones with

few designation criteria and few incentives. This study was formulated into two
parts--a set and a subset. The set aggregated data for 17 states and 357 zones. The
subset aggregated data for 14 states and 90 zones. Most of the conclusions were
found through this subset. Other conclusions worth noting are that EZs (1) are not
sweatshops , (2) are not exploited by large

corpora디ons

as tax havens for relocation ,

and (3) are not underutilized by the manufacturing industry as feared by opponents
ofEZs.
The major study by Brintnall and Green (1988 , 1991) evaluated the degree of

public and private cooperation , as well as the emphasis on public management versus
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private involvement.

πlis

study measured each state by giving scores and it found

a mixture of results. Five states (all southern) had a hands-off approach for both
public and private.

Four states in four different regions had a state-managed

approach. Four states in three different regions had a private involvement approach.
Four states in three different regions had an activist approach , with both a strong
public and a strong private emphasis. Also worth noting is the fact that one of the
authors of this study , Michael Brintnall , has been contracted by the na다onally renown
certified public accountant (CPA) firm , Price-Waterhouse, which has contracted with
HUD to develop an evaluation

때d

data program that can be applicable to EZ

programs throughout the country.
An other major evaluation study is a thorough legal review by Wolf (l 989a ,

1989b , 1990, 1991) on the judicial and attorneys general decisions on issues involving
state EZ programs. Wolf has universally found EZs to be considered valid , to have
governmental authority , and to be legally eligible for incentives mandated by state
legislation even when the language has potential conflicts with state law.
Relationship of the Studv with the Literature
The works cited in the literature review account for many of the important

references in this study. There are 85 important sources of information that are
referenced throughout this study , and the references listed in the back of this book
serve as possibly the best resource guide ever compiled on EZs and on other pertinent
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scholarship applicable to EZs. The references focus only on in-depth discussions and
analyses , which help to make this study most useful in content for any researcher of
EZs.
Again , this national study and the single case study in Appendix B help to fill
the gap in the literature on discovering the outcomes of EZs and their impacts on
employment. Chapter I provides a historical and up-to-date chronological description
of EZs , which is not found in anyone source of the literature. Chapter II provides
the complete economic and theoretical framework of EZs , which is not found in any
one source of the literature. Chapter

mdescribes the original design and analytical

techniques of deriving EZ outcomes and

characteris 디cs ，

which are not found in the

literature. Chapter IV provides a data base on EZ outcomes and
which is not found in the literature.

마apter

때aracte 더S디cs ，

V provides the hypothetical and

empirical tests on the outcomes of EZs , impacts on employment , and influences
between EZs , which are not found in the literature. Chapter VI provides a predictive
model on predicting the outcomes of EZs and , most importantly , for the policymaking of EZs , which is not found in the literature.

Appendix B provides the

employment outcomes of zone residents and participating businesses of a specific EZ ,
which are not found in the literature. In sum , the author ’ s groundbreaking work , in
whole and in each p따t， fills much of the void and moves the literature another major
step forward in the published scholarship on EZs.

CHAPTER Ill.
RESEARCH DESIGN
HYPOTHESES
The development of the hypotheses is based upon the search for

젠ndings

and

results that have never before been investigated. As noted earlier , EZs have never
been sufficiently analyzed for employment impacts before this study , and the purpose
of this study is to contribute something of value to the field of knowledge in public
policy research. To do so , the first research question must address the results of the
employment impacts of EZs.

If the findings show that there are statistically

significant impacts for employment with varying degrees of success between EZs ,
then a series of follow-up variables , based upon a theoretical development of factors
or 띠aracteris 디cs that most likely would vary the effect or employment impact, could
be tested for the degree of influence (individually and collectively) on the different
outcomes between EZs.

πlUS ，

the hypotheses are developed with these assumptions.

Li st of Hvootheses

The economic theories , economic goals , and literature review presented in the
last chapter provide the bases and theoretical underpinnings for predicting outcomes
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and findings with directional hypotheses in this study. Each directional hypothesis
predicts a cause and effect relationship between the independent and dependent
As programmed for pure research methodology , the statistical analyses

variables.

utilize null hypotheses , which predict no cause and effect relationships , when
computing the results.
hypotheses.

These statistical results either

r태 ect

or not

r태 ect

the null

These outcomes are then interpreted into the directional hypotheses ,

which are confirmed or disconfirmed through this method of inferential hypotheses
tes따19.

A predictive model of employment 따lpacts is then developed by confirming

many of the hypotheses , and useful knowledge is also gained by disconfirming any
of the hypotheses. The following seven hypotheses , which predict

caus외

links , are

presented in priority order for analyses:
1.

πle

difference in unemployment between Enterprise Zones and their

surrounding communities has been significantly decreased by EZ
2.

ac디vity.

The change in the difference in unemployment between EZs and their

surrounding communities is proportional to the period of 다me since EZ designation.
3.

The change in the difference in unemployment between EZs and their

surrounding communities is proportional to the number of EZ incentives.
4.

The

ch없1ge

in the difference in unemployment between EZs and their

surrounding communities is proportional to the kind of EZ incen다ves.
5.

The change in the difference in unemployment between EZs and their

surrounding communities is proportional to variations in EZ land use (i. e. ,
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percentages of residential , commercial , industrial , open space , and other).
6.

πIe

change in the difference in unemployment between EZs and their

surrounding communities is proportional to EZ population density.
7.

The change in the difference in unemployment between EZs and their

surrounding communities is proportional to EZ geographic size.
The first hypothesis is a comparison of the unemployment rates between EZs
and their surrounding communities , and is the foundation of this study. Surrounding
communities constitute the control group. The result of testing the fIrst hypothesis
on Unemployment Impact (as long as the results show the statistical significance that
confirms the directional hypothesis) forms the dependent variable for the testing of
the differences between EZs in the remaining six hypotheses. Thus , the testing of
hypotheses is an investigation of the unemployment rate differences between EZs and
their surrounding communities , and of the differences between those EZs that have
substantial employment impacts and those that do not.
πIe

additional six hypotheses compare EZs with EZs , while utilizing

significant independent variables as the basis for finding the causes of measurably
significant differences in their employment impacts. As shown in the hypotheses ,
these six independent variables are Time , Number of Incentives , Kind of Incentives ,
Land Use , Population , and Size.

No other study has tested for these important

variables in a research design of measuring the employment impacts or unemployment
rates of EZs.
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In determining the differences of employment impacts between EZs in

hypotheses 2 암lfough 7 , the first three independent variables represent interven디orrist
characteris디cs ，

i. e. the length of time that incentives have been established , the

quantity of incentives , and the type of incentives that are available for EZs ‘ πIe last
three independent variables represent descriotive characteris디cs ， i. e. the development,
habitation , and boundary of EZs.
One key element to comparing the differences between EZs is that locational
differences are accounted for and neutralized in the analysis. This forms a more
stable and precise measurement unit in testing the last six hypotheses. Locational
differences are accounted for by measuring the "change in the difference ," or by
comparing the unemployment changes within EZs (the study group) to the changes
throughout their surrounding communities (the control group) ,

피stead

of merely

calculating the differences in unemployment between EZs without regard for their
surrounding communities.
In this way , the comparative advantages and disadvantages , which affect
employment in one region but not in another , are statistically controlled. Other than
the varying tax rates between areas , as noted in Chapter IT , there are three additional
comparative factors. These are: (1) land and natural resources , (2) physical capital
and infrastructure , and (3) skilled labor

때d

training (Schmidt 1993).

Thus , the

influences of varying regional economic and employment factors between paired sets
of EZs and their surrounding communities are comparatively neutralized by
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measuring the "change in the difference. "
As noted earlier , it is anticipated , due to economic theories , economic goals ,
and partial results gathered from studies in the literature review , that many of the
direc디onal

hypotheses will be confirmed , especially the first hypothesis that addresses

the employment impacts of EZs. With the economic incentives of EZs , it is premised
that unemployment rates will be reduced more significantly than their surrounding
commumtIes.
It is premised that the different outcomes between EZs addressed in the second

hypothesis will be the result of the length of time , since there is often a "lag time"
for tax incentives to cause an effect in economic development (Benson 1986). In the
third and fourth hypotheses , it is premised that the amount and type of incentives will
determine the results of EZs , due to the quantity and nature of the economic
incentives available to employers and/or employees.
Due to the influences of the economies of scale and business districts , it is
premised that the fifth hypotheses on land development could possibly be confirmed ,
at least for industrial or commercial areas. Supporting this premise is the fact that
Great Britain began their EZ programs in small business
Erickson ,

Frie따nan，

"피dustri외

parks ," and the

and McCluskey (1 989) report to the U.S. Departtnent of

Commerce indicated that manufacturing areas had fared very well in 때 evaluation of
EZs.
Due to the major population and size differences between urban and rural
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locations , the sixth and seven hypotheses on the number of residents and the
dimension for EZs are both premised to possibly cause a change in the effect. The
postulate of the major differences between urban and rural areas causing a change on
the impact of employment is also applied to the fifth hypothesis on land development.
As noted earlier , even the disconfirming of any hypotheses that predict changes
between EZ outcomes , does contribute to a greater understanding of what does not
influence the employment impacts of EZs.

DATA SOURCE

This study utilizes a secondary data source collected in June 1989 by HUD.
A copy of the data set was obtained by loading , transferring , and downloading
computer files from a modem connection between Washington , D.C. and Portland ,
Oregon.

It was stored 띠 coded and structured American Standard Code for

Information Interchange (ASCII) files for universal data program conversion and

statistical manipulation. The ASCII flIes required some cleaning up of some minor
miscoding of the data. This clean up procedure is a common practice when utilizing
ASCII flI e data sets.
’The data was collected by telephone interviews , which were conducted by

HUD personnel with EZ administrators or managers throughout the country. The
interview was a follow-up after the questionnaire had been mailed to each EZ
administrator or manager. This insured that the respondents had ample opportunity
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to review the questions and to provide the most thorough and accurate answers to the
questionnaire as possible. No respondent was asked to provide a spontaneous 따1Swer
for any question.

π피s

is the "pre-contact"

때d ψre-Ietter"

method , which provides

for a higher quality of data collection (Frey , 1983). This strengthens the reliability
of the respondents answers. HUD had quality control over the interviewers as the
phone interviews and data collection took place in their headquarters in Washington ,
D.C ..

The survey instrument provided for data on questions involving EZ
characteristics , impacts , and incentives. Even though HUD expended much resources
in their data collection effort, this data has never been thoroughly an떠yzed. This data
has been made available to the author specifically for the purpose of this study.
There were twenty-three (23) states selected into a cluster group for having the purest
EZ legislation and for having

ac더ve

EZ programs among the states. All of the 336

units or EZs in the cluster group were interviewed in this survey. Obviously , those
states with the largest numbers of EZs would have more respondents in the data
collection by using this all-inclusive sample technique. About a half dozen of the 336
EZ programs did not respond to the survey , so these non-responses were zeroed out.
Local governmental officials generated the data by calculating unemployment
rates with percentages of unemployment claims , and by using resident addresses , zip
codes , and census tracts where appropriate. Although , the State of Illinois provided
data by using an in-person sample survey method , which is the same door-to-door
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method used by the U.S. Department of Labor , Bureau of Labor Statistics , in
collecting unemployment data for

ci다es.

Since calculating unemployment r따es based

on unemployment 뼈urance cla뻐s (mCs) for EZs and their surrounding communities
can be a very difficult process , the questionnaire was first sent by mail and then later
the data was collected by phone survey , thus giving each EZ respondent ample time
and opportunity to research and prepare answers for each question , including those
relating to unemployment. Similarly , the research study on Maryland by Grasso 때d
Crosse (1 991) for the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) used mcs for their
employment analysis of three EZs in Maryland.
The officials at HUD felt that collecting data from EZ administrators was
preferable to collecting data from EZ participating and non-participating businesses.
This strengthens the validity by going directly to the program representatives (EZ
administrators) , since these respondents understand the applicability of the questions
and answers to their EZ programs. The GAO study can be highly criticized for
gathering data 한om possible biased business owners , especially from the nonparticipating business owners who have an antagonistic feeling about the incentives
for participating businesses (Wolf, 1989b).
However , in some cases EZ administrators may be biased against (not for) EZ
activity , since these individuals tend to be from planning departments or fmance
officials.

Local bureaucratic planners are schooled in previous governmental

intervention and grant programs , and tend to not have free market and deregulatory
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instincts. Local finance officers are very reluctant to part with revenue and tend to
calculate EZ costs (especially revenue losses) very highly to minimize the EZ
benefits.
Since local governmental officials would more likely be biased against EZs
instead of for EZs , this gives

없ly

positive impacts by EZs a stronger basis for

representation , as the data would not be a result of mere wishful

thin퍼ng

and

selective manipulation by respondents. Another strong point in the research design
of this study is that the collected data is based on many years of EZ experience , so
more and more results , be they pro or con , are revealed in the data. Any public
policy program takes

다꼬료

for its initial implementation and then for its subsequent

outcomes to be produced and measured , and this is especially true for tax and
economic incentives (Benson 1986).
Additional secondary data sources are derived from the Erickson 때d Friedman
(1 991) study and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (1 992)
summary. Both of them were used to construct the independent variables on the
Number and Kind of Incentives for each state.
Finally , the author has some strong concerns about the HUD methodology of
using unemployment estimates generated by distant, decentralized , and local
governmental offices. It would have been better to have trained employees by HUD
or contracted professionals derive the data through a systematic and centrally
controlled process. In spite of the drawback, the author feels that it is important to
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publish the results of this national study , and to be conservative in elaborating any
positive fmdings.

QUESTIONNAIRE

The first two pages of the telephone survey instrument gave specific

instructions to the interviewers on techniques and procedures for data gathering.
There was nothing unusual about these interviewer instructions. Page three was the
first page of survey questions and constitutes the part of the questionnaire that was
used in this study , since this page had the "meaty" questions relating to
unemployment and demographics. An adaptation of these key questions can be found
in Appendix C. It is worth noting that the ten additional pages of survey questions
that were not utilized in this particular study could be analyzed in further research on
EZ activity.
As stated earlier , the survey instrument was provided to each EZ administrator
through a pre-contact mailing with a cover letter of instructions , and later the
interviewers phoned each respondent and collected the data by writing down the
responses to the same questions asked over the phone. This combination made the
interviews smooth and expeditious as they were carried out.
As shown in Appendix C , the first section of the questionnaire is an
introductory section that requests "local zone characteristics" with the zone name ,
locality , and designation date.

An independent variable was developed on the
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question regarding designation date.

πris

question enabled the author to compose an

independent variable called , Period ofTime (in Months) , which determined the length
of time that each EZ was active.
A succeeding question on unemployment rates for the EZs and their
corresponding surrounding communities at designation

때d

currently (currently

meaning June 1989 when the survey was completed) , enabled the author to compose
independent variables comparing the study group (EZs) to a control group
(surrounding communities). Thus , the author could measure the effectiveness of EZs
on employment by using a before and after "time study design ," with both the study
and control groups.
Additional independent variables were derived from Population , Geographic
Size (in Square Miles) , and Land Use questions to make comparisons between EZs.
As noted earlier , and separate from the questionnaire , the research study by Erickson
and Friedman (1 99 1) and the summary by the U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development (1 992) were utilized in providing independent variables on the
Number and Kind of Incentives for each state and local EZ program. The details of
these incentive variables will be discussed in the next two chapters.
METHODOLOGY
Statistical analyses are to be used to measure the significance and explain the
v때ance

of the independent variables , and to predict the outcome of the dependent
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variable from the data set. The specific techniques will begin with a review of the
distributions and frequencies of cases , and then proceed with difference of means tests
(T-tests) , an analysis of variance (ANOVA) , a correlation matrix , simple regression
and multiple regression stepwise analyses , and a residual analysis.
Each of these analytical methods has an intent.

The frequencies give a

preliminary indication on the results. ’The correlations give an indication of the links
between variables. The difference of means tests measure for significance.

πle

analysis of variance measures for a comparison of means between influential

때d

nominal variables. The regression analysis measures for significance , explains the
variance , measures and orders and compares the coefficients or the influence of
independent variables on the dependent variable , and is used to build a predictive
model for the weighted values of each significant variable. The successful completion
of this predictive model constitutes an invaluable contribution of this study to public
policy research. ’The residual analysis compares the actual and predicted outcomes
for each EZ case in applying the predictive model specifically within the data set.
Lastly , the predictive model is translated and applied in general to all EZs outside of
the data set.
To test for the frrst hypothesis on the Unemployment Impact between EZs and
their surrounding communities , a paired difference of means test with ratio data is
used to test for statistical significance. ’The paired or matched T-test is appropriate
for this analysis , which allows for testing a subset of the data set.
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까Ie

Maryland study on EZ employment by Grasso and Crosse (1 991) , which

was reported to the U.S. General Accounting

0댄ce

(1 988) , tested for

sta디stical

significance by using an interrupted time series (ITS) 때alysis for tes따Ig a "moving
difference of means."

까lUS ，

difference of means testing has been used for EZ

employment questions. Since the author’ s study utilizes a before and after time study
on EZs with a control group (surrounding communities) , a difference of means test
is appropriate for this data set.
πlis

first test on the difference in the change of unemployment between EZs

and their surrounding communities is fundamental to tes디ng the remaining hypotheses ,
since the research model requires that the dependent variable be statistically
significant. Additionally , to test for the third and fourth hypotheses on the Number
and Kind of Incentives , independent difference of means tests (independent T-tests)
are also used for both hypotheses , while an analysis of variance is used for the fourth
hypothesis to compare the specific incentives that have the greatest impacts. These
influential variables are parsimoniously selected for this ANOVA technique.
To test for all ofthe remaining hypotheses (2-7) by measuring the simultaneous
influence of all significant variables , multiple regression analysis is utilized to derive
this

vi떼

information. Interval data is used in hypotheses 2 , 3 , 6 , and 7 , which is

appropriate for regression analysis. Ratio data is used in hypothesis 5 and is equally
appropriate. Nominal data is used in hypotheses 3 and 4 , and it is converted into
dummy variables (dichotomous categories or groups) as needed to be appropriate for
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the analytical techniques.
The study by Erickson

뻐d

Friedman (1989 , 1991) at Pennsylvania State

University using 1985-86 national HOO data , utilized multiple regression stepwise
techniques to measure correlation coefficients and to explain the variances of the
variables. Erickson 때d Friedman (1991) evaluated overall characteristics of EZs to
better explain state programs and activities occurring within the targeted areas.
Regression analysis was also utilized in the Four State Perspective Study by Elling
and Sheldon (1 991). Elling and Sheldon (1 991) researched the jobs created and
retained by EZ finns , along with EZ investment d이lars ， by categories of "all firms ,
new finns , expanding fmns ,

없ld

relocating firms."

Thus , multiple regression

stepwise techniques are appropriate in analyzing the many variables proposed in this
study.
The three previous sch이arly studies cited above are the most comparable to

the author’s research methods. However , the author’s study went beyond these other
studies by building a predictive model for universal application in the United States ,
and by utilizing residual analysis , which is an analytical , case by case , follow-up to
the regression

때a1ysis.

’Thus , each EZ in this study will be compared to the

predictive model. Again , the most valuable contribution of this methodology was the
sta디S디cal

development of a predictive model on the performance of EZs for those

variables proved significant.

πlis

analytical model is applicable to predicting and

evaluating outcomes on all EZs , including those designated in the past , present , and
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future.
Lastly , the level of significance selected in the methodology for this study is
at the commonly accepted probability of 5 % or .05 and below.

The level of

significance refers to the probability of r법 ecting a null hypothesis when in fact it is
true. As noted earlier, this significance level or statistical result for each test is
interpreted by inference into confirming or disconflm 파19 each directional hypothesis.
Thus , a probability value of .05 or below will

r태ect

the null hypothesis and confrrm

the directional hypothesis , while a probability value greater than the significance level
standard will neither r태ect the null hypothesis nor confirm the directional hypothesis.

CHAPTER IV.

DATA REVIEW

CASE SELECTION

Li st of Criteria

The criteria for the case selection was based on the five following parameters ,
with four parameters relating to employment factors and one

p없ameter

relating to a

non-employment factor:
1. All appropriate questions had to answered by the respondent, especially the
questions involving unemployment at the date of designation and currently (date of
survey) for both the zone and the surrounding community (see Appendix C). All
partial responses were deemed inappropriate , since different sets and subsets of cases
would be answering different ques디ons.
2.

There had to be at least a 5 % unemployment rate in the zone at

designation , since this is the "natural rate of unemployment," which has historically
and narrowly oscillated at 5 % during most of this century with labor-market
tr때si디ons

(Vane

ar띠 πlOmpson

1979; Vedder and

it does not make sense to create an EZ in an
unemployment.

따ea

G떠loway

1993). By defInition ,

with less than a natural rate of
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3. The unemployment rate in the EZ had to be higher than in the surrounding
community. By defInition , it does not make sense for government to create a targeted
area for economic growth that has greater employment than the rest of the
community.
4. The

띠ange

in the difference in unemployment (between an EZ and its

surrounding community) had to be less than double digits or 10% , as data above this
amount was seen as showing a couple of outliers with enormous differences from the
great body of the data with an average of 1.5 %.

It did not make sense to

automatically attribute these outliers of up to 20 %, which were enormously positive
indicators in the data , to the impact of EZs.

By eliminating the outliers , this

prevented a couple of cases skewing the results in 삶vor ofEZs. As noted in Chapter
I and

n, the debate on the merits of EZs is very heated, so the author did not want

to base any positive impacts on a couple of cases skewing the results.
5. The dimension of an EZ had to be less than 50 squ따e miles. This allowed
for both urban and rural areas. By definition , 때 EZ is a narrowly targeted area , both
urban and rural.

So , any area larger than 50

squ따e

miles was not considered a

targeted program. There were no cases between 50-100 square miles that met the
four employment

par따neters.

Thus a few cases with hundreds and thousands of

square miles were eliminated as falling outside of the EZ definition. These few cases
were regional sections of the states and were outliers to the data base.
The parameters narrowed the number of cases (or EZs) to 60.

The first
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par따neter

narrowed down most of the cases , and the other four parameters narrowed

them further.

πlis

gave the author the best possible set of cases to measure the

outcome with validity and reliability. It appears that the local government officials
responding to the total survey could not easily answer all of the questions on
unemployment involving changes and differences. This is not surprising , since not all
of the state legislatures mandate a report on unemployment in EZs and surrounding
communities each year.
Another issue with the unemployment data is it appears that some of the EZ
administrators may have used 1980 census tract data to answer all of the unemployment
questions , which would show no change in unemployment. This could skew the results
against EZs. Yet, these eleven cases were left in the data set, since , first of all , there
is no definite proof one way or the other that the EZ administrators used only 1980
census data, and secondly , any positive impact of EZs could not be falsely attributed by
critics to case filtering and manipulation. Thus , any impact of EZs on unemployment
must be

m에 or

to show a positive resul t. Also , any positive result would not be subject

to overstatement in the findings of this study.
A strong recommendation resulting from this survey and data review is that the
federal government should mandate an annual report by each EZ jurisdiction on the
outcomes , especially the outcome of unemployment changes and differences between EZs
and their surrounding communities. This would be most appropriate for federal EZs
receiving economic incentives , although the current federallegislation (with only modest
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incentives to influence their impacts) would result in only nine case studies.
DATA OBSERVATIONS
Table I on page 84 lists the states (14) and the number of EZs in each state
represented in the study. The State of Ill inois had a total of 16 EZs (or 27% of all
cases), which was over twice as many EZs as any other state. The Midwest was the
region with the largest number of EZs at 30 (or 50% of all cases), which came from four
states. The South was the region with the most states at five , which accounted for 18
EZs (or 30% of all cases). The East had two states and eight EZs (or 13.3% of all
cases). The West had three states and four EZs (or 6.7% of all cases).
It appears from the data in Table 1 that the State of Ill inois and the Midwest

region , along with the South region , have substantial representation on the results of this
study. The East and West regions have moderate , but important , representation. The
regional breakdowns in the study sample are similar to the actual EZ activities legislated
in the states throughout the country , with the Midwest and South having many EZ
programs and the West having few EZ programs. The exceptions are that Ill inois is
overrepresented in the Midwest and the East is slightly underrepresented as a region
when comparing the data with actual legislated EZ programs. But overall, it is a solid
study sample.
Finally , Table I shows that the total number of responses (60) based on the
criteria for case selection is at a 18 % response rate. Another interesting observation is
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TABLE I

빼
-l

STATES AND NUMBER OF ZONES IN DATA SET

14 States
Alabama
California
Florida
Illinois

2
I
M
6
3
3
l
3
5
I
5
7
6-@

III따ana

Ke1ltucky

서따

Missouri
Nevada
NewJersey
Ohio
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Texas
Virginia

Regional Distribution:
9ν-

-ι

M-r I-M

m
oH

6

M0

4

5

%

&μth

TX

7

VA

6

KY

3

AL
FL

1
1
18

-필쁘L

PA
NJ

5

J.
8

-파썰

CA
NV
OR

2
1

1
4
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that 23 states participated in the survey , but only 14 states provided complete
responses based on the criteria for a 61 % response rate. Again, the method of precontact by

m없I

and follow-up interview by phone enabled nearly a fifth of

없l

respondents to obtain the requested unemployment data for the survey. As noted
earlier , some EZ programs are better able to produce the requested data than others ,
due to reporting mandates for the state legislatures. Ill inois EZs reported unemployment
rates through an annual survey , which is why· it had greater representation as shown in
Table I.
As noted in the selection criteria , Table II on pages 86-88 shows the
unemployment rates where the zone is higher than the surrounding community at
designation and the zone has at least a 5 % unemployment rate at designation. It is
organized state by state with unemployment rates for the zone at designation
(ZNUMPDES) , the surrounding community at designation (CUMPDES) , the zone
currently (ZNUMPCUR) , the surrounding community currently (CUMPCUR) , the
difference in the zone between designation and currently (dz) , and the difference in the
surrounding community between designation and currently (de). The variables dz and
dc have been created by utilizing the four previous variables in the HUD survey ‘
The means show that the zones have double digit unemployment rates both at
designation and currently , while the surrounding communities have less than double digit
rates. The mean difference in the zones (dz) has a huge decrease of 3.8% , while the
mean difference in the surrounding communities (dc) has a decrease of 2.3%. This
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TABLE II
UNEMPLOYMENT RATES

ZNUMPDES

CUMPDES

ZNUMPCUR

CUMPCUR

20.0

15.5

20.0

CALIFORNIA:
Fresno
13.3
Pittsburgh
13.3

7.9
6.1

FLORIDA:
Franklin

ALABAMA:
Dallas Co.

15.0

.J1z...

dc

11 .3

0.0

4.2

18.9
13.3

9.6
6.1

-5.6
0.0

-1.7
0.0

4.0

15.0

4.0

0.0

0.0

5.9

11.5
7.2
7.5
12.8
13.2
19.2
9.8
20.2
11.0
26.0
14.0
9.2
12.0
13.2
10.1
7.0

11.5
6.1
7.0
9.0
8.7
12.4

-5.3
5.0
1.0
1.3
0.0
9.6
1.8
0.0
2.0
-5.0
8.9
2.7
9.6
4.2
2.8
15.6

-5.6
4.4
1.0
0.9
0.0
4.9
2.5
0.0
2.0
-5.0
-0.7
3.3
3.4
3.6
1.4
7.8

6.0
5.0
5.4

12‘ 9
4.6
10.0
8.1
13.5
lαo

3.6
3.0
3.3
7.1
9.5
6.5

4.5
2.6
3.4

2.8
2.0
2.0

ιL1NOIS:

Belleville
Belvider
Blue Island
Bureau
Ce1ltra
띠lia

Danville
Dixon
East Chicago
Illiopolis
Mound City
Olney
Riverbend
Rock Island
SW Madison
Urbana
Wi ll Co.
INDIANA:
Anderson
Elkhart
Evansville
Hammond
Madison
Michigan
KENTUCKY:
Ashland
Campbell
Covington

6.2
12.2
8.5
14.1
13.2
28.8
11.6
20.2
13.0
21.0
22.9
11.9
21.6
17.4
12.9
22.6
20.9

10.5
8.0

9.9
8.7
17.3
9.9
12.9
12.0
10.0
8.7
10.4
11.0
Iα7

6.2
14.0

χ4

12.9
10.0
15.0
9.4
7.1
7.6
7.1
4.8
6.2

12.6
19.0
18.4
20.7
18.0

9‘ 6
8.0
8.7
13.0
16.0
12.0

8.0
8.0
9.0
10.3

7.2
8.0

5.9
6.5
5.5

18.8
12.5
13.7

14.5
7.0
10.0

14.3
9.9
10.3

11.7
5.0
8.0
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TABLE II continued
UNEMPLOYMENT RATES

ZNUMPDES

CUMPDES

ZNUMPCUR

CUMPCUR

2α7

13.6
8.1

11.3
12.9

4.0

0.0

2.8

20.4

7.0

16.0

9.6
5.3
6.5

9.4

12.9

4.4

0.5

13.7

5.1

13.7

5.1

αo

0.0

NEWJERSEY:
Camden
12.5
Millville
13.0
Orange City
20.9

7.0
11.0

5.0
9.2
12.6

2.6
1.2
1.5

2.0

16.4

9.9
11.8
19.4

OHIO:
Ashland
Columbus
Fairfield
Marion Co.
Springfield

12.1
13.7
26.6
19.7
13.3

9.1
6.3
14.4
14.1
5.5

10.5
10.0

5.5
4.8
5.9
7.6
5.5

5.6
4.8
18.1
9.2
3.3

3.6
1.5
8.5
6.5

OREGON:
Seaside

5.9

5.2

5.9

5.2

0.0

0.0

25.5

24.0
7.0
14.0

12.0
18.1

29.0

8.0
6.0
13.0

16.0
1.0
1.0

12.2
6.3

5.5
4.2

13.0
0.9
-2.0
10.7
0.8

-0.2

14.2
15.8
9.5
14.8
8.3

8.8
12.6
5.1
8.9
8.2

0.0

0.0

13.0

11.0

11.4

9.1

MISSOURI:
Broo/ifi eld
Chillicothe
St. Joseph

피L

dc

NE ι4DA:

Las Vegas

PENNSYLVANIA:
Johnstown
McKeespon
Monessen
Lancaster
Reading

19.0
27.0
22.9
7.1

TEXAS:
14.2
Athens
Brownsville
18.3
9.5
Dimmett
14.8
Gainsville
Mount Pleasant 8.3
13.0
San Benito
21.9
T짧IS Cit)’

9.9

4.0
8.8
14.1
5.1
8.9

8.0
11.0
13.4

6.5
8.9
8.5

1.8
3.8

0.0

4.4

2.5

1.5

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
10.5

0.0
0.0
-0.2
0.0
4.3
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TABLE II continued
UNEMPLOYMENT RATES

O
&0
16
7

Sa
띠ltvil.
띠
lle

14.0
15.9

”“

』

MEAN

6.6

’ι

Waynesboro

14.8

12

9.9

fuMW

fu

m

7u
。。

12.0
15.0
10.1

이“ 。。

VIRGINIA:
Chesapeake
Danville
Newport
Norfolk

ZNUMPCUR

페 ιJ
μ

CUMPDES
ι

ZNUMPDES

nJ

12.1

CUMPCUR

와~

J!£.

4.5

2.0

1.5

8.0

0.0

αo

1.5

α8

3.5

8.0

4.4
4.0

4.9

-1 .4

-1.7

7.6

3.8

2.3

4.8
4.2

4.0

Kev to Table II
ZNUMPDES
CUMPDES
ZNUMPCUR
CUMPCUR

k
de

Designation
Unemployment Rate at Designation
Currently
Unemployment Rate Currently
and ZNUMPCUR (or the Zone
Designation minus the Zone Unemployment Rate
and CUMPCUR (or the Surrounding
Rate at Designation minus the Surrounding
Current찌
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illustrates that unemployment decreased for

따I

areas (which is correlated to the fact

that overall unemployment dropped in the 1980s) , but it decreased much more
dramatically and sharply in EZs.
Table ill on pages 90-92 shows the difference of unemployment rates between
changes within the zones and changes within their surrounding communities , which
is variable dz-dc. By utilizing the variables dz and dc in Table II , the variable dz-dc
(or dz minus dc) has been created by taking the difference in the zone between
designation and currently , and subtracting the difference in the surrounding
community between designation and currently.

까Ie

mean result of dz-dc (or the

change in the difference of means) is 1.5 %. In other words , the average impact of
EZs on unemployment, when taking into account the locational differences of
suπ뻐띠ing

communities , is a decrease in the unemployment rate of 1. 5 % greater

than what occurred in the surrounding communities. Thus , the impact of the EZs on

decreasing unemployment is 65 % greater than the decline in the surrounding
communitJes.
The variables dz and dc , as shown in Tables II and III , formulated a paired Ttest in the next chapter , which was is to measure the statistical significance of the frrst
hypothesis on the impact of EZs on unemployment. As noted in Chapter ill, the
result of this test , then became the dependent variable to test the remaining hypotheses
on the differences between EZs.
Continuing on Table ill, it shows that the average length of time since

90
TABLE III
SIGNIFICANT VARIABLES
Mon따

-4.2

24

CALIFORNIA:
Fresno
-3.9
Pittsburgh
0.0

32
17

FLORIDA:
Franklin

0.0

29

03
O6.
OnJ
O4
OAJ
4?
4?
0 nj
0J
0J
9 6.

””
”%
””
”“

ALABAMA:
Co.

Dalli따

High
High

No

No

No

No

6

High

No

Yes

6

High

Yes

Yes

6

High

Yes

Yes

3

Lo w

Yes

Yes

5

깨9

η
자
ω Xω

9.3
1.6
6.7

E

1.0

R

m
자
ω
ζU

“T
j

, 1l
1)

ζU

--4-

6 (N)

m
””
”w

j

No

%

””

?J
--nu

No

X
씨

KENTUCKY:
Ashland
Campbell
Covington

Low

5

Jj
62
I4
78

3.5

4

mY

oj

4.0

파띄쁘ζ E끄[lg.다X

경

INDIANA:
Anderson
Elkhart
Evansville
Hammond
Madison
Michigan

Rank

경

IllINOIS:
Belleville
Belvider
Blue Island
Bureau
Centralia
Danville
Dixon
East Chicago
Illiopolis
Mound City
Olney
SW Madison
Riverbend
Rock Island
Urbana
Will Co.

INCENTIVES

경

따:따

iaT
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TABLE III continued
SIGNIFICANT VARIABLES

3.9
5.4
-2.8

INCENTIVES

Rank

파댄쁘ζ 겐끽llJll1J.

””

8

High

Yes

Yes

I

Low

No

No

6

High

No

No

ηι
째잉

MISSOURI:
St. Joseph
Broo/ifi eld
Chillicothe

Mo다따S

ημ

따:따

5

High

Yes

Yes

l

Low

No

Yes

3

Low

No

Yes

4

Lo w

No

Yes

%
%

NEVADA:
Las

Veg，따

0.0

NEWJERSEY:
Camden
0.6
Millville
-0.6
Orange Cit)’ -2.3
OHIO:
Ashland
Columbus
Fairfield
Marion Co.

9.6
2.7

Sprin，햄 eld

3.3

2.0
3.3

5

%
%

7

%

OREGON:
Seα')ide

PENNSYLVANIA:
Johnstown
Monessen
Lancaster
McKeesport
Reading

0.0

6

-3.0
-3.0
6.3

%
8
%
?
%

-αl

1.0

TEχ4S:

Athens
Brownsville
Dimmett
Gainsville
Moullt Pleasallt
San Benito
Texas City

0.0
1.0

0.0
0.0
α2

αo

6.2

Oy

n7

,J
?/
j4T

1l
,/
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TABLE III continued
SIGNIFICANT VARIABLES
따:따

INCENTIVES

Rank

센띤쁘으 뀐끄l2!ll1Y.

Lo w

Yes

3

”“

Saltville
Chesapeake
Danville
Newport

0.9
0.3
0.0
0.5
0.0
0.7

자
ω “
ω 자
ωXω

VIRGINIA:

Mon따

MEAN

1.5

38

4.9

Noψlk
W따Iflesboro

No

m%

Incemives Breakdown
페 Lω

. 싸야

&

W

= 36 zones or 60%

= 24 zones or 40%

Income:
Yes
= 39 zones or 65%
No
= 21 zones or 35%
Property:
Yes
= 47 zones or 78%
No
= 13 zones or 22%
Kev to Table III
dz-dc

Months
Incentives
Rank
Income
Property
(N)
깨9

Unemploymem Impact, or the change in the Di￦rence between the Zone and
the Surrounding C01wmmity, or the Difference between the Zone
Unemployment Rate at Designation and the Zone Unemployment Rate
Currently "minus" the D{야rence between the Surrounding Co1tu/lU nity
Unemployment Rate at Designation and the Surrounding Co1tumlllio’
Unemploymem Rate Currently , or (ZNUMPDES - ZNUMPCUR) (CUMPDES Period of Time (from date of designation to current ψ
， or June 1989 survey)
"Number" of Incentives (available through State
Group "Rank" for Number of Incentives, μ to 4 = Low; 5 to 8 = High)
Employer
Employer
Nolan
Waters
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designation for each zone is 38 months , or three years

없ld

two months. The time

period of EZs is somewhat of a limiting factor , since programs only began in the
1980s and the survey was conducted in June of 1989, yet there is a varied enough
difference in time periods to measure for the significant influence on EZs. A good
dispersement of the cases is illustrated through the following breakdown of the
number of zones grouped by the time period in years: 0-1 years = 12 zones; 1-2
years

= 6 zones; 2-3 years = 10 zones; 3-4 years = 9 zones; 4-5 years = 9 zones;

and 5-6 years = 14 zones.
Again the incentive variables have been created by utilizing the study by
Erickson 때d Friedman (1 99 1) and the summary by the U.S. Department ofHousing
and Urban Development (1 992) , and added to the data base. The average quantity
of

incen다ves

is 4.9 , or just under 5

incen더ves

per zone. The subcategories of the

Number of Incentives show that 60% of the zones have a high Rank (5-8 incentives
is high and 1-4 incentives is low) , 65 % have employer Income Tax incentives , and
78 % have employer Property Tax incentives.
There are 12 types of incentives that have been utilized by EZ programs

throughout the country (Erickson

때d Friedm없1

1991). In Table III , the highest

Number of Incentives for a state (8 for Missouri) is only two-thirds of the possible
incentives , while the average number of incentives is only four-tenths. However, it
should be noted that the apportioned and qualitative strength of each type of incentive
between the states , such as varying percentages and amounts of tax abatements and

94
credits , is not represented in Table III.
All of these variables (dz - dc or Unemployment Impact, the Period of T따Ie
or Months , the Number and Rank of Incentives , and the Kind of Incentives or
Property and Income Taxes) in Table ill will be thoroughly discussed in chapter five.
All of these variables proved to be statistically significant, although , for incentives ,
it is the incentive subcategories (Rank, Property Tax , and Income Tax) and not the
total number , which reached a level of statistical significance.
Table IV on pages 95-97 shows developed and undeveloped land percentages
by the zones. Only one zone (Springfield , Ohio) did not complete land use data. On
average , the vast majority of Land Use in the zones are Residential , Commercial , and
Industrial areas with mean totals of 28.8% , 2 1. 1%, and 26.5% respectively. This

proportional land development was expected as EZs are most often targeted for these
specific areas of mixed land development in communities , especially those with
combined neighborhoods and business districts.
The categories of Open and Other property uses are not specifically defmed
in the survey , so some misunderstanding by the respondents may have resulted with
agriculturalland , which could be arbitrarily put into either category. This is indicated
in the cases where "Other" property use had mainly zero percentages reported with
a few cases showing very high percentages. For the most part, this did not affect the
results as Residential , Commercial , 없Id Industrial are self-explanatory. Additionally ,
urban zones have public , vacant, and undeveloped property uses , but not agricultural;
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TABLEIV
LAND USE PERCENTAGES
RES

ζ다M

IND

OPEN OTHER

20.0

10.0

30.0

40.0

0.0

CALIF’ORNIA:
Fresno
38.0
Pittsburgh
25.0

15.0
25.0

45.0
20.0

1.0
30.0

1.0
0.0

FLORIDA:
Franklin

70.0

10.0

10.0

10.0

αo

45.0
0.0
50.0
10.0
21.0
16.0
36.0
5.0
10.0
20.0

4αo

lαo

30.0
15.0
15.0
4.0
30.0
4.0

70.0
25.0
5.0
6.0
40.0
22.0

2.2

52.7

8.0
5.0

10.0
25.0

5.0
0.0
10.0
70.0
33.0
14.0
35.0
40.1
72.0
50.0
0.0
34.0
10.0
36.0
24.0
10.0

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
36.0
0.0
3.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

6.0
3.0
2.0
15.0
16.0
19.0

16.0
0.0
0.0

5.0
0.0
0.0

0.0
0.0
0.0

ALABAMA:
Dallas Co.

ILLINOIS:
Belleville
Belvider
Blue Island
Bureau
Centralia
Danville
Dixon
East Chicago
Illiopolis
Mound City
Olney
Riverbend
Rock Island
SW Madison
Urbana
Wi ll Co.

n.o

96.8

7.2

10.0
2.0
22.0
28.0
60.0

5.0
18.0
3.0
31.0
10.0

51.0
70.0
39.0
17.0
20.0

INDIANA:
Anderson
Elkhart
Evansville
Hatrunond
Madison
Michigan

67.3

3.6

7.1

46.0
32.0
23.0
32.0
34.0

18.0
9.0

33.0
57.0
56.0
28.0
21.0

KENTUCKY:
Ashland
Campbell
Covington

25.0
25.0
40.0

3.2
24.0
7.0

4αo

65.0
40.0

30.0
10.0
2αo

αo

0.0
0.0
0.0

2.8
0.0
19.0
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TABLE IV continued
LAND USE PERCENTAGES

RES

ζOM

과파

Q짝꾀 OTJ뀔E

MISSOURI:
Brookfield
Chillicothe
St. Joseph

47.0
25.0
15.0

25.0
5.0
20.0

20.0
50.0
20.0

6.0
2.0
10.0

2.0
18.0
35.0

NEVADA:
Vegas

55.0

10.0

5.0

30.0

0.0

NEWJERSEY:
Camden
25.0
Millville
0.0
Orange City 5αo

65.0
60.0
23.0

10.0
40.0
17.0

0.0
0.0
10.0

0.0
0.0
0.0

20.0
21.0
20.0
65.0

25.0

35.0

18.0

4.8

2.2

1.9

15.0
10.0

30.0
15.0

25.0
5.0

2.0
70.1
10.0
5.0

fa

nfa

nfa

nfa

nfa

25.0

15.0

10.0

40.0

10.0

35.0
23.0
30.0

Reading

29.2

16.4

30.0
15.0
60.0
60.0
54.4

0.0
0.0
5.0
10.0
0.0

10.0

MOll
떼
/lessen

25.0
62.0
0.0
10.0

Athens
45.0
Brownsville
25.0
Dimmett
2.0
Gainsville
50.0
Mou 1lt Pleasa1lt 15.0
San Benito
35.0
Texas City
20.0

30.0
45.0
1.0

10.0
20.0
2.0
15.0
5.0
25.0
40.0

15.0
10.0
2.0
25.0
55.0
25.0
30.0

10.0
0.0
93.0
0.0
15.0
0.0
0.0

Las

OHIO:
Ashland
Columbus
Fairfield
Marion Co.
Sprin，아e띠

OREGON:
Seaside
PENNSYLVANIA:
‘Johnstown
La ncaster
McKeesport

1l

2αo

αo

5.0
0.0
0.0

TE.χ4S:

lαo

10.0
15.0
10.0
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TABLE IV continued
LAND USE PERCENTAGES

RES

41.0

18.0

28.8

%“

o
nJ
nJ

J

21.1

Q많'!1

4.0
25.0
27.0
23.0
20.0
35.0

20.0
20.0

nU

1.0
1.0

nU

26.5

17.1

30.0
12.0

OTHER

m
o.

J
D
nUU
MU

νL

10.0

J
J

IND

얘。

MEAN*

44.0
30.0
48.0

μπ。
α갔 끼%

VIRGINIA:
Chesapeake
Danville
Newport
Norfolk
Saltville
Waynesboro

ζOM

m

6.9

* Combined means slightl)’ higher than 100% due to rounding off
Kev to Table IV
RES
COM
IND
OPEN
OTHER

nla

= Percentage of "Residential" Land Use
Percentage of "Commercia l" Land Use
Percentage of "Industrial" Land Use
= Percentage of "Open" Land Use
= Percentage of "Other" La nd Use
= Not available
=
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whereas , rural zones solely have the agricultural areas.

So , the Open and Other

property uses could be separated or lumped together accordingly (although neither
grouping changed the results in the next chapter).
Table V on pages 99-101 shows two of the descriptive elements of the zones ,
which are Population Density and Geographic Size (in Square Miles). The average
population at designation is 12 ,177 with an increase to 13 ,295 at the date of the
survey. Many of the EZ administrators or managers appeared to use 1980 census
data for both designation and current questions , so the populations appear unchanged.
This would also

nul1i텀

any shifts in population that occurred during this time frame.

Thus , the population data from this survey is useful only to measure the impact of
density on unemployment , and not for calculating population

shi한s

in the equation.

The calculation of the population shifts by comparing the years 1980

때d

1990 is

available from the U.S. Census Bureau , but this was not pertinent , available , or
utilized in this study.
Several zones (Belvider, Blue Island , and Olney Illinois; McKeesport,
Pennsylvania; Mount Pleasant, Texas; and Chesapeake ,

Virg띠ia)

do not have

complete population data , but do 없ve complete data for the unemployment questions
so they are kept in the study. The largest zone in both categories of Population and
Geographic Size is Columbus , County in Ohio. Columbus is many times greater in
population than the other EZs and only St. Joseph , Missouri is close to it in square
miles , as both zones were many times greater in size than the other EZs. However ,
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TABLE V
POPULATION AND GEOGRAPHIC SIZE

ZNPOPDES
ALABAMA:
Dallas Co.

2, 000

CALIFORNIA:
Fresno
27,000

ZNPOPCl 깨

꿇ζ

2,000

3.7

Piπ'sburgh

9, 161

27,000
9, 161

10.0
1.6

FLORIDA:
Franklin

4,000

4,000

1.0

36,315
3,570

37, 415

ιLINOIS:

Belleville
Belvider
Blue Island
Bureau
Cemralia
Danville
Dixon
East Chicago
Illiopolis
Mound City
Olney
Riverbend
Rock Island
SW Madiso1l
Urbana
Will Co.

10,460
6,225
18, 917
6, 125
54,000

6,000
19,041
6, 125
54,000

8.2
6.7
8.0
10.1
6.7
4.7
6.5
2.8
10.0
2.0
4.4
11.5
2.5
10.0
1.8
10.3

INDIANA:
Anderson
Elkhart
Evansville
Hmrul101l d
Madison
Michigan

7, 657
6, 977
7, 919
7,075
5,204
8,000

8, 200
7,000
7,300
7, 737
5, 482
8,000

1.8
1.5
2.5
2.5
2.0
2.9

KENTUCKY:
Ashland
Campbell
Covington

2, 938
28,505
8,082

7, 977
29,240

4.2
9.5
13.4

3α 000

nla
nla

3, 665
17,040
6,548
8,225
5, 837
5,500
1, 102

3,290
7,040
6,200
8,225
5,837
5,500
1, 102

nla

nla
lα528

3α 630
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TABLE V continued
POPULATION AND GEOGRAPHIC SIZE

ZNPOPDES
MISSOURI:
Broo/ifi eld
Chillicothe
St. Joseph

ZNPOPCUR

펄E

2, 961
2, 826
29, 956

2, 961
2,420
32, 000

3.5
3.0
41 .4

10,803

lα 803

2.0

NEWJERSEY:
28,505
Camden
Millville
7, 581
Orange City
12, 724

29, 240
7, 951
12, 127

9.4
14.0
0.7

NEιIDA:

Las

Vegas

OHIO:
Ashland
Columbus
Fairfield
Marion Co.

6, 204
223,500
4, 483

6, 204
211 , 297
4,300

3α 250

3α 250

Sprin，따eld

47,078

48,600

3.1
44.0
2.0
6.0
2.3

OREGON:
Seaside

5, 735

5, 735

4.1

24,000
13, 615
3, 659
560

22, 000
14,500

3.5
2.0
1.1
3.6
2.0

PENNSYL ι4NIA:

Johnstown
Lancaster

McKeesport
Monessen
Reading

nla

lα538

600
32, 772

2, 120
6,585
2,505
5,252

2,300
6, 585
2,505
5, 252

Mau ll! Pleasall! nla
San Benito
9,267
Texas Ciη
6, 887

9,267
6, 887

TEXAS:
Athens
Brownsville
Dimmett
Gain
ιlsville

nla

4.6
9.8
14.5
12.8
14.4
2.6
9.9
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TABLE V continued
POPULATION AND GEOGRAPHIC SIZE
ZNPOPDES
VIRGINIA:
Chesapeake
Danville
Newport
Norfolk
Saltville
Waynesboro
MEAN

ZNPOPCUR

lα388

펄g

nla
2, 139

1.6

2, 139
2α586

2α 960

25,442
1,000
2, 832

25,400
1, 050

2.6
3.2

2, 832

0.4
0.9

12, 177

13, 295

6.5

1.0

Kev to Table V
ZNPOPDES
ZNPOPCUR
Size
nla

= Population in the Zone at Designation
=

Population in the Zone Currently

= Geographic Square Miles of Zone

= Not available

102

Columbus has been maintained in the study , since it falls within the strict definition
of an EZ , plus it has unemployment data on 떠1 pertinent questions in the survey. The
average size of the zones was 6.5 square miles , and by removing Columbus and St.
Joseph from the data set for purposes of illustration only , the average dropped mildly
to 5.3 square miles. Again , this shows the targeted nature of an EZ program.
The variables derived from both Tables IV and V proved not to be statistically
significant as will be discussed in the next chapter. However , these variables are
interesting to review in gaining a greater understanding of EZs.

CHAPTER V
RESULTS OF TESTING THE HYPOTHESES
UNEMPLOYMENT IMPACT
Hypothesis 1: The difference in unemployment between Enterprise Zones and
their surrounding areas has been significantly decreased by EZ

ac다vity.

Paired T-test
As discussed in chapter three , the first hypothesis on Unemployment Impact
is tested by utilizing a matched or paired T-Test to analyze the
and their surrounding communities.

me따IS

between EZs

This test measures the significance for the

change in the difference of the means. To set up the variables , the difference in
unemployment in the zone between designation and currently (ZNUMPDES ZNUMPCUR = dz) , is compared to the

di잠erence

in unemployment in the

surrounding community between designation and currently (CUMPDES - CUMPCUR

=

dc).

따mlysis.

The zone and its surrounding community are matched or paired in this

This comparison constitutes the "change" in the difference in unemployment

between the zone and its surrounding community (or dz-dc). This analysis not only
tests the first hypothesis , but the result or change becomes the dependent variable for
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testing the remaining six hypotheses , which compare the differences between the
zones.
The results for the means of the unemployment rate variables are shown in

Table VI on page 105. The outcome is that the change in the difference between the
zones and their surrounding communities is significant with a probability value of
.0006. Thus , the first directional hypothesis on Unemployment Impact is confirmed.
The difference of means for the zone is 3.8 % and the surrounding community is

2.3 %, while the change in the difference of means is 1.5 %. Again , the difference
in the zone is about 65 % greater than the difference in the surrounding community ,
which makes the significance level appear to be predictable before confirming it with
the T-test.
This

statis디떼ly

significant decrease in EZ unemployment is the most

important contribution of this study to the field of public policy research. ’Therefore ,
삼lis

analysis shows that EZs do have a positive impact on reducing unemployment.

This positive impact is especially meaningful , since , historically , poverty areas are
the last to improve in good economic times and the first to get worse in bad economic
times. Again , this significant unemployment outcome is the foundation and dependent
variable for testing the impacts between the EZs in the remaining hypotheses.
(Additionally , the single case study in Appendix B supports the conclusion of a
posi디ve

employment impact. In Portland , Oregon, 61 % of all new hires are zone

residents. )
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TABLE VI
PAIRED T-TEST

UNEMPLOYMENT RATES:
STANDARD
DEVIATION

MINIMUM

MAXIMUM

ZNUMPDES
ZNUMPCUR
dz

5.4
4.6
5.1

5.9
5.9
-5.6

28.8

CUMPDES
CUMPCUR
dc

3.9
2.7
3.3

3.2
4.0
-5.6

24.0

VARIABLES

dz - dc (change in
or
3.8 - 2.3 = 1.5

MEAN

di.￦rences)

1.5

29.0

18.1

15.0
16.0

3.1

p = .0006

N

= 60

Kev to Table VI
ZNUMPDES
CUMPDES
ZNUMPCUR
CUMPCUR
dz
dc
dz - dc

Zone Unemploymem Rate at Designation
Surrounding C01runllnity Unemploymem Rate at Designation
Zone Unemployment Rate Curremly
Surrounding Conunllni η Unemploymem Rate Curremly
Di￦rence between ZNUMPDES and ZNUMPCUR (or the Zone
Unemploymem Rate at Designation minus the Zone Unemploymem Rate
Curremly)
Di￦rence between CUMPDES and CUMPCUR (or the Surrounding
COlrununity Unemploymem Rate at Designation minus the Surrounding
Conunllnity Unemploymem Rate Currelltω
Change in the 따!ference inunemploymem between EZs and their surrounding
cOlrunllnltles
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CAUSAL IMPACTS BETWEEN ZONES
As discussed in chapter three , the remaining hypotheses are
utilizing simple regression

an따ysis ，

뻐a1yzed

by first

T-tests , analysis of variance (ANOVA) , and a

correlation matrix to establish the significant building blocks for the more
sophisticated techniques of multiple regression stepwise and residual analyses. This
provides a very strong methodology for testing the variables and hypotheses.

Simole Re l! ression
The next step in testing the remaining hypotheses is taken by using a simple
regression technique for measuring the significance of each independent variable with
interval and ratio data.

Thus , hypotheses 2 , 3, 5 , 6 , and 7 are tested , with the

independent variables of Time , Number of Incentives , Land Use , Population Density ,
and Geographic Size respectively.
The simple regression results show significance only for one of the

independent variables with either interval or ratio data , the Period of Time (in
Months). Thus , Time or Months is the only variable in this first set that will be used
in the upcoming higher analysis of the multiple regression stepwise technique. In
reviewing a graph on the slope on the Number of Incentives , there is an indica디on
with a gradual upward slope that significance could result if this variable is divided
into groups. But measuring the regression coefficient of this data by dividing it into
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three interval groups does not produce significance, so the quantity of incentives are
recoded into high 없ld low dichotomous groups to test for the difference of means with
aT-tes t.
T-tests
As noted earlier , aT-test with paired groups was utilized to measure the
significance level for hypothesis 1 on Unemployment Impact. Subsequently , T-tests
with independent groups are used to measure the significance levels for hypothesis 3
on the Number of Incentives and hypothesis 4 on the Kind of Incentives. Table VII
on page 108 shows the three T-tests for the significant independent variables , with the
top illustrating the high/low Rank, followed by the two types of incentives , emolover
Property Tax abatements (middle of table) and 효파띠와만 Income Tax credits (bottom
of table). Property Tax and Income Tax are the only incentives out of the twelve
different types of incentives that are significant. ’The lists and descriptions showing
the states and types of incentives in the study by Erickson 때d Friedman (1 991) and
the summary by HUn (1 992) were utilized to create the data for the independent
variables in testing hypothesis 4 on the Kind of Incentives.
As discussed in the last chapter , the high Rank was from five to eight
incentives and the low Rank was from one to four incentives. The high group has a
1.72% greater impact on unemployment than the low group , and is significant at the
.023 level. ’This outcome is a positive indicator in reducing EZ unemployment, but
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TABLE VII
T-TESTS

IndeDende1lt Variables
RANK:
High
Low

N

M띤lL

36
24

.1l:.딴

Di￦rence

2.16

Standard
Deviation

1.72

3.4
2.3
0.8

2.04
-0.62
2.66

3.2
1.7
0.9

2.31

3.1
2.6
0.8

p = .023
PROPERTYTAX:
Yes
No

47
13

Di￦rence

p = .0003
INCOME TAX:
Yes
No
Di￦rence

39
21

퍼꾀g

2.40

p = .0026
Dependem Variable = dz - dc (or the change in the difference
in unemploymem between EZs and their surrounding communities)
Property and Income Tax ince1ltives are for the "employer"
N

=

number of cases
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it is not necessarily a strong indicator since the incentives as fixed and equal intervals ,
and scaled from one to eight, are not significant. This outcome does not take into
account the different revenue amounts or dollar values that separate states have for
specific incentives.

Thus , there is no qualitative value on the amount of each

incentive between the states , only the quantitative number of incentives is analyzed
in this tes t. Up to this point in time , no study has provided the measurable amount
of value for each type of incentive between the states , and to do so is another
recommendation by the author for further study by EZ researchers.
The next two T-tests on Table

vn provide means and significance levels for

the two variables , Property and Income Tax , in regard to the Kind of Incentives.
Between zones with and without these incentives , Property Tax abatements have a
2.66% greater impact on unemployment at a significance level of .0003 , and Income
Tax credits have a 2 .40% greater impact on unemployment at a significance level of
.0026. In fact , those zones without Property Tax incentives have a -0.62 or negative
impact on unemployment, while those zones without Income Tax incentives have a
-0.09 or negative impact on unemployment. This outcome shows these incentives
to be strong indicators of EZ performance. Since the average positive impact on
unemployment by EZs is 1.5 % greater than the surrounding communities , Property
Tax and Income Tax incentives have a much greater impact on reducing
unemployment than the average zone with 2.66% and 2 .40% positive impacts
respectively.
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Analvsis of Variance
The separate and combined impacts on unemployment of the two incentives ,
Property Tax and Income Tax , were evaluated with an ANOVA illustrated in Table

vm on page

111. ANOVA is used to measure the means only and is not used as a

test for correlation and statistical significance between the two independent variables.
The mean square value (F-test) translated into a probability value (neither value is
shown in Table

vm

to prevent confusion) indicates that there is no interaction or

linkage between the two incentives. These variables have no influence on each other,
but the earlier T-tests show the distinct significance of each of these variables in
reducing unemployment.
The important point in Table

vm is that those zones with both Property Tax

and Income Tax incen디ves have a 4.14% greater impact on unemployment than those
zones that were without both incentives. This indicates a major impact on reducing
unemployment and is another major fmding to the field of public policy research.
Again , this zone impact was over and above the reduction of unemployment in the
surrounding communities. In fact , those zones without both of these incentives have
a -1. 49% or negative impact on unemployment, while those zones with only a
Property Tax incentive have a 2.10% positive impact, and those zones with only an
Income Tax incentive have a 1.89 % positive impact. All of these outcomes intensify

the interpretive meaning that the two combined incentives have a major impact on

-------,,
1

‘

TABLE VIII
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE

TAX INCENTIVES: INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
E끄ll!i낀l

핀띤쁘ζ .lY...

No
No
Yes
Yes

No
Yes
No
Yes

Difference
(between two

7
6
14
33

Standard
Mean Deviation
-1 .49

1.98

0.40
0.61

0.37

2.65

2.67
3.22

4.14
l lO 'S

and two yes 's)

Dependent Variable = dz - dc (or the change in the 짜야rence
in unemployment between EZs and their surrounding communities)
N = number of cases
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reducing unemployment.

Correlation Matrix
After completing the T-tests and initial simple regression analysis , there are
four independent

va더abIes

and one dependent variable that have shown statistical

significance , and which are tested by the more sophisticated regression and residual
methods. Before these advanced techniques are utilized , the variables are

없Ialyzed

by utilizing the correlation matrix in Table IX on page 113 , which provides the
Pearson ’ s correlation coefficients and simple regression probability values. Again ,
Unemployment Impact or dz-dc (change in the difference in unemployment between
EZs and their surrounding communities) is the dependent variable for further analysis.
Rank, Property Tax , and Income Tax are significant independent variables as

measured by the T-tests. Months is a significant independent variable as measured
by the simple regression analysis.
The correlation with the Unemployment Impact is strongest by the two type

of incentive variables , Income Tax (.37) and Property Tax (.36). Yet, there is a
stronger correlation between the Income Tax variable and two other variables , Months
(.51) 따ld Rank (.47). This very strong correlation indicates that Income Tax has a
broad overlapping influence with Months and Rank on Unemployment Impact, which
would reduce the predictive correlation for Income Tax in the forthcoming multiple
regression stepwise technique.
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TABLE IX
CORRELATION MATRIX

PEARSON ’S CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS:
Unemployment Income Property
Imoact (dz-dcJ l따- -뀔!Unemployment Impact* 1.00
(dz - dc)
.00

.3 7

.36
.0037 .0054

Months Rank
(hi Jlhflowl

ι빡와

.31
.0171

.27
.0352

Income Tax

.37

1.00

.21

.51

.4 7

Property Tax

.36

.21

1.00

-.01

.23

Months (time)

.31

.51

-.01

1.00

.20

.27

.4 7

.23

.20

1.00

Rank (high/low)

* Unemployme’nt Impact (dz - dc) = dependent variable
* Pearson ’'s correlation coefficient = top score
* Simple regression probability value = bottom score
Kev to Table IX
dz - dc

=

Rank

=

Change in the d댄erence in unemployment between EZs and their
surrounding cO/lullUnities
Number of incentives (high/low groups)
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It was an디cipated that both Income Tax and Property Tax would have a strong

correlation with Rank, since Rank divides the Number of Incentives into two groups ,
those with many incentives and those with few incentives. Yet, according to the
correlation , those zones with a Property Tax incentive are not conglomerated into the
high group , as are those zones that have an Income Tax incentive. Thus , Property
Tax does not have a broad overlapping influence with Rank, as does Income Tax with
both Rank and Months. So , Property Tax should m없ntain its individual strength as
an indicator of Unemployment Impact and it should be the strongest indicator in the
forthcoming sophisticated regression method. Another important point is that there
are no other strong correlations in the matrix , and this is especially 얀ue for Property
Tax and Months , which have no correlation and a very slight inverse correlation with
a -.01 coefficient.
Lastly , the simple regression probability values in the correlation matrix
reiterate the link of the significant independent variables with the dependent variable.
These significant values determine the selection of variables that are utilized in the
advanced predictive method in the next section. The probability value for Months is
the same as was tested earlier, while the values for Property Tax , Income Tax , and
Rank are slightly varied from the values in the T-tests. This is explained by the fact

that the earlier T-tests appropriately reported values based on "separate variances"
(where it is assumed that the variances between the two groups of the independent
variable !!댄 끄와 the same) , and not the "pooled variances" (where it is assumed that
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the variances between the two groups of the independent variable 딱료 the same).

πIe

values for the p。이ed variances and the simple regression in the correlation matrix are
mathematically iden디cal ， however, both values for the separate and pooled variances
are significant.
Multiole Regression Steowise Analvsis
After completing the previous analytical building blocks , a sophisticated
predictive model with the influences on the dependent variable (Unemployment
Impact) by the significant independent variables (Income Tax , Property Tax , Months ,

and Rank) is investigated with the multiple regression stepwise technique. On pages
116-117 , Table X

피ustrates

the final step summary with the components of a

regression model , and a step-by-step explanation of the variance with the influences
of each independent variable. Each independent variable is entered according to the
level of correlation with the dependent variable as previously shown in the correlation
matrix.
’The total R-square or variance explained is nearly 25.5 %, and the multiple

regression ’s fmal step is significant at a level of .0025.

Property Tax has the

strongest influence in the regression model , followed by Months and Income Tax , and
lastly by Rank, according to the standardized Beta weight.

Due to the

multicollinearity between Income Tax and Months , and Income Tax and Rank, the
Income Tax variable dropped in the degree of influence or amount of regression
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TABLEX
MULTIPLE REGRESSION STEPWISE ANALYSIS

FINAL STEP SUMMARY:
Depende1lt Variable

Unemployme1lt Impact (dz - de)

R-Square

.2548

Probabili η

Value

.0025

IndeDende1lt Variables ...1L.
Propelη Tax (Pη
2.29
Months (MO)
0.03
Income Tax (IT)
1.01
Rank (RK)
0.55
Consta1lt
-3.01

월따

.31
.21
.16
.09

Standard
Error
0.91
α 02

α99

0.84
1.42

Regression Model of b:
Unemployment impact (dz - de) = Consta1lt + PT + MO + IT + RK or
-3.01 + 2.29 x (PT 0 or 1) + .03 x (MO 1-71) + 1.01 x (IT 0 or 1) + .55 x (RK 1 or 2)
STEP-BY-STEP SUMMARY:
R-Square
Variables E1ltered
1. Income Tax
2. Property Tax
3. Mo1lths
4. Rank

R-월쁘t:fl.

.1363
.2171
.2491
.2548

다띤양

.1363
.0808
.0320
.0057
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TABLE X continued

Kev Table X
dz - de
R-Squared
Probability Value
Constant
b

Beta

Standard Error

Th e change in the 따함rence in unemployment between EZs and their
surroU1uJing cOlrununities.
Th e proportion of variance explained in the dependent variable by
the independent variables.
Statistical sign핸cance level (.05 or below is sign핸cant).
Intercept a or the value of the dependellt variable when the
independent variables are equal to zero .
Th e partial regression co뺑cient or the change produced in the
dependent variable by a unit change in the independent variable
colltrolling for the other independent variables.
Th e partial "standardized" regression coefficient or the change
produced in the dependellt variable by a unit change in the
independem variable when both are measured in terms of standard
deviation units.
A measure ofthe standard deviation of b values where b should be
two times the standard error to reject the null hypothesis.
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weight.

Also , Income Tax has a higher correlation with Property Tax than does

Months with Property Tax (which has a very slight inverse correlation) , so this
contributes to Income Tax dropping below Months in the weighted model.
In the

파la1

step , Property Tax is the only variable that is significant (with b

at least twice as high as the standard error) , since the multicollinearity changed the
significance levels for Income Tax , Months , and Rank variables (although each of
these variables is significant when excluding the other multicollinear v따iables). Also ,
Rank has the least influence of all the variables and has very little variance explained ,

due to the fact that the other variables are stronger indicators or predictors.
However , Rank is an important indicator when calculating predictions on
Unemployment Impact with the regression model. The predictive fmdings and farreaching conclusions of the regression model will be discussed in the next chapter.
Finally , the step-by-step summary shows that the two types of incentive
variables , Property Tax and Income Tax , explain most of the v따iance at nearly 22 %,
with Months contributing another 3 % to the overall total. However, when Income
Tax is excluded from the model , Months and Rank nearly make up all of the variance
explained by Income Tax.

Summarizing the Remaining Hvpotheses
As discussed in Chapter ill, hypotheses 2 through 7 test for the different
impacts on unemployment between the EZs. Three of these hypotheses (on Time ,
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and Number and Kind of Incentives) have been confirmed through the statistical
analyses , and all six of the remaining hypotheses will be summarized in the following
discussion.
Hypothesis 2. The

ch따Ige

in the difference in unemployment between EZs

and their surrounding communities is proportional to the period of

디me

since EZ

designation.
The second hypothesis on time has been confirmed and the variable was
created in Months instead of years , so that a continuum of expanded interval data
could be better utilized in the analyses. The Months variable is

signific 없It.

It was

originally conceived in the research design that the length of time would be a very
strong indicator on the impact ofunemployment when comparing the EZs. Time has
proven to be so.
Hypothesis 3. The change in the difference in unemployment between EZs
and their surrounding communities is proportional to the number of EZ incentives.
The Number of Incentives placed into two dichotomous groups does confirm
the third hypothesis. Rank is significant , but it is not necessarily a strong indicator ,
since the number of incentives utilized as interval data from one to eight is not
significant. Since there is no qualitative measurement on the value or strength of each
incentive between the states , the grouping is only a significant indicator of
Unemployment Impact for states with either many (5-8) or few (1 -4) incentives. Yet,
this high versus low incentive package is an important indicator in the predictive
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mode1.
Hypothesis 4. The change in the difference in unemployment between EZs
and their surrounding communities is proportional to the

헤nd

of incen디ves.

There are two types of incentives that confum the fourth hypothesis , as

employer Property Tax abatements and employer Income Tax credits are significant.
These two incentives are strong indicators on Unemployment Impact. (The single
case study in Appendix B supports the conclusion that Property Tax abatements have
a positive impact on the employment of zone residents.) Property Tax is individually
strong , while Income Tax is highly correlated with both Months and Rank. Overall ,
these two type of incentive variables have a very strong influence in the regression
model , and this appears to be due to the dollar value available to the employers from
these incentives , as shown in the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development summary (1 992). Thus , there appears to be a correlation between the
"dollar value" of the incentive with the "type" of incentive , which needs to be studied
further.
It is important to note that these variables are 갱mployer-based incentives ," and

their influence is in accord with the theoretical premise that incentives for employers
are the most effective in creating and retaining jobs.

Additionally , the Sales Tax

variable by itself was not significant in this study , but there is some indication that
it is significant within a full-scale incentives package. Also other economic impact
studies show that the level of sales taxes is an important indicator to business activity
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Thus , the Sales Tax incentive should be investigated in future

and job growth.
studies.

Hypothesis 5. The change in the difference in unemployment between EZs
and their surrounding communities is proportional to variations in EZ land use (i. e. ,
percentages of residential , commercial , industrial , open space , and other).
The fifth hypothesis is disconfirmed , since none of the Land Use combinations

are significant.

πlis

indicates that EZs effectively reduce unemployment regardless

of the variations of land development. This also indicates that it is the incentives
within the EZ areas , and not the land development, which is the primary influence
on reducing unemployment. This finding is somewhat contrary to that of a previous
study by Erickson , Frie따없n ， and McCluskey (1 989) , which found that EZs in
primarily manufacturing areas produce more jobs than the EZs in other areas.
However , this study did not compare study and control groups.

So , it is

recommended that the variations in EZ land development should again be analyzed
in future studies.
Hypothesis 6. The change in the difference in unemployment between EZs
and their surrounding communities is proportional to EZ population density.
The sixth hypothesis is disconfirmed , as the Population variable is not
significant. This indicates that EZs effectively reduce unemployment regardless of
the Population densities in both urban and rural EZ areas. Thus , urban EZ residents
따ld

rural EZ residents are both benefitting from EZs in their communities.
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Hypothesis 7. The change in the difference in unemployment between EZs
and their surrounding communities is proportional to EZ geographic size.

’The seventh hypothesis is disconfirmed , as the Square Miles variable is not
significant.

까lis

indicates that EZs effectively reduce unemployment regardless of

the boundary or size , as long as the EZ program is specifically targeted within the
study ’ s data set with a boundary range of .4 to 44 square miles.

πlis

does not

translate into making predictions , either pro or con , on broader or regional areas with
economic development programs.
It should also be noted that the variables from the three disconfirmed

hypotheses are correlated , and therefore , are not significant (collectively as well as
individually) when testing for their combinations of influence.

Residential ,

Commercial , and Industrial land development variables are intercorrelated with the
more dense Population and smaller boundary Size variables ofurban areas. Open and
Other land development variables are intercorrelated with the less dense Population
and larger boundary Size variables of rural areas. By definition , EZs target depressed
and multifarious business districts , so it is not surprising that there would be job
growth in most of these urban and rural areas , regardless of their descriptive
characteristics , when strong economic incentives have been in place for considerable
lengths of time.
In sum , the first hypothesis (on Unemployment Impact) is confirmed and is the

foundation of this study. The second , third , and fou rth, hypotheses (on Time , and
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Number and Kind of Incentives) are confirmed , and their significant variables explain
25.5 % of the variance on the differences between the EZs. Since only a quarter or
so of the variance is explained , there are other influences to be considered. But the
fifth , sixth , and seventh hypotheses (on Land Use , Population , and Size) are
disconfirmed , and their variables are neither significant nor do they contribute to the
predictive model on the differences between the EZs. However , the findings on all
of the hypotheses provide valuable information on ga띠ing a greater understanding of
EZs.

CHAPTER VI
POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
PREDICTIVE FINDINGS
After confirming several hypotheses , the significant variables (Unemployment
Impact, Property Tax , Months , Income Tax , and Rank) are manipulated into the

predictive model. The first section is a 앨웰파.Q application of the regression model ,
which produces specific residuals for each EZ case (actual versus predicted) within
the study’s data set. The second section is a

g델료댈1

application of the regression

model , which produces predictive findings applicable to all EZ programs in general-past , present and future. However , other external influences are unaccounted for in
the linear models , such as the effects of a shrinking number of unemployed workers ,
so this fact should temper any interpretations of the predictive fmdings , especially for
the generalized model.
Residual Analvsis
The regression model is specifically applied to each EZ case in the study with
the residual analysis in Table XI on pages 125-127. The residual analysis utilizes the
regression formula on all of the significant independent variables (Property Tax ,
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TABLE XI
RESIDUAL ANALYSIS
건다핀ill.

Predicted*

Residual

ALABAMA:
Dallas Co.

0

24

0

l

-4.2

-1.74

-2 .46

CALIFORNIA:
Fresno
O
Pittsburgh
O

32

O
O

2
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TABLE XI continued
RESIDUAL ANALYSIS
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TABLE XI continued
RESIDUAL ANALYSIS
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* Regression Model of b:
Unemploymem Impact (dz - dc) = Constant + PT + MO + IT + RK or
-3.01 + 2.29 x (PT 0 or 1) + .03 x (MO 1-71) + 1.01 x (IT 0 or I) + .55 x (RK 1 or 깅
Kev to Table XI
PT
MO
IT
RK
Actual
따

P
R
b

.m

·M d

Property tax incentive (0 = no, I = yes)
Momhs ψeriod of time)
Income tax incemive (0 = no, 1 = yes)
Rank η = low group or 1-4 incentives, 2 = high group or 5-8 incentives)
Actual unemploymem impact by zone (dz - dc or the change in the 짜야rence
in unemploymem between EZs and their surrounding communities)
Predicted unemployment impact by zone based on regression model
Margin of "error" between actual and predicted
Th e partial regression co炳dent or the change produced in the dependellt
variable by a unit change in the independellt variable colltrolling for the
other independellt variables
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Months , Income Tax , and Rank) in calculating the predicted values for the dependent
variable (Unemployment Impact) for each EZ case. ’Then a comparison between the
펀파학

Unemployment Impact by each EZ versus the m:웰~댈 g Unemployment Impact

by each EZ , forms the residual or margin of eπor. There are many EZs that perform
according to the predictive model , while many others perform contrary to the
predictive model with plus or minus margins of error. This shows a varied mix of
performances by the EZs and states.
There is little residual or error for Texas and

Virg 띠ia ，

but both have few

incentives. Texas has been ac디ve with EZs for less than a year, with a Property Tax
ince띠ve

and without an Income Tax incentive , and the performance is in accord with

the predictive model , except for one EZ (Texas City). Conversely , Virginia has been
active for several years , with an Income Tax incentive

따ld

without a Property Tax

incentive , and the performance is also in accord with the predictive model. In fact ,
Virg띠ia

conforms to the predictive model more so than any other state.

Illinois has the most EZs , which perform strongly in both directions with plus

and minus residuals , and two EZs (Olney and Will County) perform much better than
what the model predicts. Also , Indiana has one EZ (Anderson) , Missouri has one EZ
(Chillicothe) , Ohio has one EZ (Fairfield) , Pennsylvania has one EZ (Lancaster) , and
again Texas has one EZ (Texas City) which performed much better than what the model
predicts. All of these EZs perform 4-6% better than what the model predicts. Ill inois ,
Indiana , Missouri , and Ohio all have full-scale incentive packages , so it is not surprising
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that these states would have some EZs that perform exceptionally wel l.
Contrariwise , Pennsylvania has another EZ (Johnstown) , which performs nearly
5 % worse than what the model predicts. All of the EZs in Alabama, Florida , and
Kentucky perform worse than what the model predicts, which include much of the
southern region. Additionally, Alabama, California, Nevada, and New Jersey (i n a
cross-section of regions) are all predicted to have a 쁘뿔따ξ performance. This is due
to the fact that these states have weak incentives , and have neither an employer Property
Tax abatement nor an employer Income Tax credit, which are the strongest influences
of all the incentives on Unemployment Impact. As predicted , the EZs in Alabama ,
California , Nevada , and New Jersey perform poorly on reducing unemploymen t. This
is in accord with the theoretical precise that poverty areas are the first to get worse in
bad economic times and the last to get better in good economic times , especially when
there are no strong economic incentives in the poverty areas.
As a policy-making tool , the residual analysis provides all states with measurable
and specific feedback on performance , which can assist the states in changing their
legislated policies and incentives on poorly performing EZ programs.

Also , the

regression model can help to effectively create and implement new EZ programs and
policies by the states and federal government.
Predictive Model
The full-scale incentives package (with Property Tax , Income Tax , and High
Rank) is manipulated into the regression model in Table XII on page 130 to illustrate the
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TABLE XII
REGRESSION MODEL

Regression Model of b:
UnemJ깨'oyment Impact (dz - de) = Constant + PT + MO + IT + RK
or -3.01 + 2.29 x (PT 0 or 1) + .03 x (MO 1-71) + 1.01 x (IT 0 or 1) + .55 x (RK 1 or 깅
R-Square or variance explained
따.:...1:.힘 빡짝꾀쁘 f

1.5%

1.5%
1.5%
6.0%

*

3

State/Locallncentives Package

%
%
%

Property and Income Taxes , and High Rank
Property Tax and High Rank
Property and Income Taxes , and Lo w Rank
Property Tax and Lo w Rank
Income Tax and High Rank
Income Tax and Lo w Rank
High Rank
Lo w Rank
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Property and Income Taxes , and High Rank

”“

강

1.5%
1.5%
1.5%
1.5%
1.5%

= 25.5%

m
m

Th e number of months is

striαly

a linear estimate.

Kev to Table XII
dz - dc at 1.5% =
dz - dc at 6.0% =
R-Square
mn
wu

m
M
b

Th is unemployme1lt impact is the average of the stuψ ’'s data set
Th is unemployme1lt impact would result in the average EZ being equal to its

surrounding cOl1l1mmity
Th e proportion of variance explained in the depende 1lt variable by the
independent variables
Property Tax ince1ltive (0 = 110, 1 = yes)
Income Tax incentive (0 = 110, 1 = yes)
Mo1lths (range = 1-71)
Rank μ = low group or 1-4 incentives, 2 = high grOlψ or 5-8 ince1ltives)
Th e partial regression coefficie1lt or the change produced in the depende1lt
variable by a unit change in the independe1lt variable co1ltrolling for the
other independent variables
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predictive values (between Unemployment Impact and Months). This is translated
into an impact/time series table , which shows the number of Months that it takes for
an incentive package to cause a specific percentage of Unemployment Impact. This
predictive model can universally be applied to

crea따19

EZ policies and programs , but

the linear estimates should not be concluded as precise for the relationship between
‘

large

때ounts

of Time and

I따ge ch없1ges

in Unemployment Impact.

An Unemployment Impact of 1.5 %, which is the average per zone/community

in the study , is a good indicator for comparing the various incentive packages. A
full-scale incentives package of Property Tax , Income Tax , and High Rank, shows
an average Unemployment Impact in three months.

This fmding illustrates the

immediate impact that a full-scale EZ program has on reducing unemployment.
When Property Tax and High Rank are combined , the average Unemployment Impact
occurs in twelve months or a year.

When Property Tax and Income Tax are

combined with Low Rank, the average Unemployment Impact occurs in 22 months
or just under two years. These incentive packages have an strong influence , which
are more immediate and much quicker than the average in the study ’ s data set with
a mean of 38 months.
Property Tax is a predictor in every equation where the average
Unemployment Impact occurs within the 71 month range of the study ’ s data set.
When reviewing the relative strength of the variables between the states in the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development summary (1992) , Propelty Tax
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appears to have much more relative value in dollars than the other incentives.

까피s

accounts for Property Tax having the single most influence on Unemployment Impact.
Income Tax and High Rank are also 血port없it predictors in reducing the

length of time for having an impact on unemployment.

Low Rank has the least

influence on reducing the length of time. One or the other Rank groupings must be
included in every equation , since a Low Rank means that there is at least one
incentive , but no more than four incentives. By defInition , Property Tax and Income
Tax must include some influence by Rank in the equation, especially since this
low/high criterion is included in the interaction of all the regression weights.
An Unemployment Impact of 6 %, which causes the average EZ to be equal
to its surrounding community , is illustrated with a full-scale incentives package. An
average Unemployment Impact of 6% will occur in 126 months or 10+ years.
Generally speaking , this means that a full-scale EZ program could be designed by any
state with a policy goal of reducing unemployment in the EZ to the level of its
surrounding community in ten and a half years.

πlis

also means that a full-scale EZ

program at the state level is a long term program, but with a

signific따it

impact on

unemployment in just three months as noted in Table XII. A subs떠n디ve federal
program could also add a greater and quicker impact on unemployment, which will
be discussed in the next section.
Finally ,

와I

of the above findings on the amounts of Time and changes of

Unemployment Impact are based strictly on linear estimates , which exclude any other
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까lis

factors.

has limitations.

For instance , due to the shrinking inventory of

unemployed workers , it takes more and more time to close the unemployment rate
gap between EZs and their surrounding communities , as the percentage of the gap
shrinks. It should be noted that fmdings based on the linear estimates should not be
regarded as precise conclusions , but only as directional trends. However, the results
and predictive model do show relative "thresholds ," where a small-scale incentives
package has little impact, while a large-scale incentives package has a significant
impact (over time) on employment.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

There are many policy recommendations that have been inferred and referred

to throughout this study , and these will be reviewed in the three following categories
and summaries:
Incentives
It is highly recommended that state governments should implement substantive

EZ incentives and legislation. This recommendation is based on the fact the EZs with
full-scale incentives do have a major impact on reducing unemployment. Some states
have already implemented substantive EZs , however, many states could improve and
revise their EZ legislation , while other states should create EZ legislation.
까le

influence of an EZ incentive is related to its dollar value , although the
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influence and not the relative dollar value (which varies between the states for the
same type of incentive) was analyzed in this study. Within existing state programs ,
the influence of employer property tax abatements is the strongest of the state/local
incentives , which makes property tax incentives the most influential factor in reducing
unemployment. The influence of employer income tax credits is not quite as strong
as the employer property tax abatements , but income taxes do have a relevant
influence in reducing unemployment. Thus , states should either add or create these
incentives for EZs in implementing a full-scale program at the state/local level.
The federal government should increase the economic incentives in its EZ
legislation, but the newest bill should moderately help to strengthen the nine
federal/state EZs (yet to be designated) with the supplemental economic incentives.
The new bill adds an employer income tax credit at the federal level , and this type

of

ince때ve

proved to be a significant variable in reducing unemployment in this

study. The federal income tax credit for EZ employers has a dollar value

larger'th때

the income tax credits in the states , but it is also restricted to the hiring of zone
residents , whereas m따ly states target incentives for employers to the hiring of new
employees in general.
Relatively speaking , the dollar value of employer income tax credits is not
nearly as strong as the capital gains tax exclusions for employers in the previously
vetoed , 1992 federallegislation. As counterparts , the dollar value of capital gains tax
exclusions at the federallevel is even stronger than the property tax abatements at the
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state/locallevel , so , based upon the dollar value , the capital gains tax incentive has
the greatest potential of

떠I

incentives for reducing unemployment. Historically ,

lowering the capital gains tax rate has spurred massive business investment in general
(Brookes 1982) , as capital is the life-blood of investment. As this study strongly
indicates by translating the state experience to the federallevel , amending the new bill
by mandating a full-scale incentives package , such as adding capital gains tax
exclusions , is necessary for a serious and ambitious EZ program at the federalleve l.
Reducing interest rates and regulatory burdens on loans for EZ firms is another
moderate step that should be taken for increasing the incentives package.
Community development

b때ks

and funds would not only be an impetus to start-up

and expanding businesses , but these financial institutions could serve as a fmgerpost
and marketing tool for encouraging investment in EZs. Financial banking incentives
also have the advantage of weighing the "risks" of participating businesses.
Incentives should primarily be targeted at employers , which is where jobs are

created and entrepreneurship is formulated. The results of this study confirms that
incentives for employers are the only significant variables in reducing unemployment.
However, supplemental incentives for residents and employees , such as personal
income tax deductions and health

insur없ice

credits , should be implemented as

additional building blocks to a full-scale incentives package. Also , infrastructure
maintenance and redevelopment should be included in any community development
policy and financed by increased EZ tax revenues (as is done in New Jersey).
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Administration. Jurisdiction. and Scone
It is recommended that EZs should be a combined federal and state/local
government initiative wherever possible.

It is not possible that the federal

government can match every state EZ area, which totals over 3 ,000

피

number and

is growing , although a combined approach for selected EZs should have the most
effective means in reducing unemployment by providing a greater incentives package.
A federal effort should be as expansive in scope as possible , while targeting the
poverty areas with the severest needs. Thus , the new bill should be amended to
designate many more areas than merely nine for receiving incentives (as well as
providing much greater economic incentives).
However, any federal regulation should not
b피

s더fie

local control. So , the new

should be amended to allow for greater state/local autonomy in experimenting

with new initiatives. Examples ofthis type offederalism , cooperation , and innovation
are the allowances of a federal Medicaid waiver in regard to the State of Oregon ’ s
state-wide health plan

때d

of a federal welfare waiver in regard to the State of

Wisconsin ’ s workfare program in two counties. Removing the distance between the
public and private sectors in fostering a localized cooperative partnership is essential
to the efficiency and efficacy of the targeted EZ program. Thus , local control is
central to local policy

ini디a디ves.

The federal and state governments should mandate that annual and specific
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unemployment data be reported on EZs and their surrounding communities. This
administrative report should be a necessary regulation for designation. πris report
on unemployment is vital in evalua따19 the effectiveness of an EZ program , and to the
making of new

따ld

improved EZ policies where necessary.

EZs need to be better marketed. A stipulation upon designation should also
be that there is an administrative marketing plan to strategically assist in producing
an effective EZ program. The Illinois and Maryland studies show that many business
owners and managers do not know about the incentives , even when these businesses
are located in designated EZ areas. Advertising , communication , and information
should be essential components of every administered EZ

progr，뻐1.

However , other regulations and red tape should be reduced , since an Illinois
study showed that many firms do not apply for incentives due to the excessive paper
work and cumbersome administrative process. Regulatory relief should be a priority
in all aspects of economic development. Regulatory relief, in general , is a stimulus
to business , especially small business , as it causes fewer impediments to starting a
business and fewer costs to staying in business. Regulatory relief will increase the
effectiveness of an EZ program.

R탤료앞으뇨

It is recommended that several more scholarly investigations are needed to
evaluate the results of EZs. EZ job creation and retention, along with EZ business
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creation and retention , should be continuously studied.

The data is currently too

limited to do thorough analyses in these areas. As time moves on , more and more
data should become available for extensive studies.
More benefit-cost analyses should be completed , especially on the costs per EZ
job created , plus the benefits per EZ business created or expanded.

This should

include the reduction of welfare assistance 없ld the addition of tax revenues generated
by EZ employers and employees , directly and indirectly , as well as
in the surrounding communities.

sp피over

effects

More benefit-cost analyses would also provide

valuable information on the thresholds (lower and high떠 of incen다ve packages.
A study on the relative strengths and dollar values of the incentives is greatly
needed , so that the influences of the same and varying incentives between the states
can be thoroughly evaluated. ’The strength of an incentive is related to its dollar
value , but a scale is necessary to compare the same types of incentives with differing
dollar values between the states.
More study is needed on the impact of sales taxes , not only for retail
businesses but for industrial businesses , which make large purchases of equipment and
supplies for production , especially in those states with high sales tax rates. Although
EZ programs are varied between the states , there are common and major components
amongst many states and localities , such as income , property ,

따ld s없es

tax

incentives , which are worthy of further analysis. As noted earlier , only property and
income taxes by themselves have significant impacts on reducing unemployment in
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this study. However, there are indications in this study that sales tax incentives are
significant within a full-scale package of incentives. There may also be some EZs
where sales taxes alone are significant.
The impact of land use

뻐d

development should be studied further , as the

results of this study were in partial contrast to those on manufacturing areas in an
earlier study. This can be explained by the fact that the earlier study only counted
the number of EZ jobs created without comparing study and control groups.
However, more analyses on land use

없ld

development is in order.

More study on EZ businesses (kinds of industries , and sizes of companies , and
increases , changes or shifts in any participating corporation’ s EZ and non-EZ
production sites) and on the impacts of financial incentives would be helpful on
evaluating EZs. Also , more study on the comparison between the "jobs to people"
(targeting geography) approach versus the "people to jobs"

(targe파19

portability)

approach is needed.
Lastly , the specific impacts on EZ residents should be studied further.

In

Appendix B, the author is attempting to take the fIrst step forward by analyzing the
total EZ jobs created versus the EZ jobs created and filled by EZ residents in
Portland , Oregon. This
residents.

COlli얀itutes

a

I때뼈ark

case study on the new jobs and zone

140
Summarv Statement
In conclusion , this study has shown that EZs are very effective in reducing

unemployment, and that the interventionist factors (or economic incentives) have a
significant impact on the performance of EZs , while the descriptive characteristics (or
land use , population , and size) do not have such an impact. The high goals of this
study have been reached , and the results and conclusions of this study make a major
contribution to the field of public policy research.
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APPENDIX A
STATES WITH ENTERPRISE ZONE LEGISLATION*

Alabama μ2)
Arizona μ1)
Arkansas (458)
Cal，따ηlia** (34)
Colorado (1 6)
Connecticut (11)
Delaware β이
District of Columbia (3)
Florida β이
Georgia (3)
Hawaii (-)
lllblOis (9이
Indiana (15)
Kansas (255)
Kentucky (1 ω
Louisiana (1, 553)
Maine*** (4)
Maryland (1 끼
Michigan (1)
Minnesota*** μ이

Mississippi*** (25)
Missouri (5이
Neb"α!jka

(-)

Nevada (2)
New Jersey (10)
New York μ9)
Ohio (22 끼
Oklahoma (88)
Oregon β이
Pennsylvania (45)
Rhode Island (5)
South Carolina (3)
Te1ll1eSSee (2)
Texas (1 03)

Utah η5)
Vermont (3)
Virginia μ8)
West Virginia (-)
Wi sco1lSin (8)

Totals: 38 states and one district with 3, 232 zones (zones in parentheses above)
Hawaii , Nebraska , and West Virginia are in the process of establishing and
designating zones

*

**
***

Including Washington , D. C‘
Caliφmia has two legislated progral1lS, I때ned aηer legislators Nolan and
Waters
SUIαet provisions (legislation under review for renewal)

(Th is data is adapted from the 1992 U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development summary.)
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STATES WITHOUT ENTERPRISE ZONE LEGISLATION
Alaska

Idllho
Iowa
Massachusetts
Molltana
New Hampshire
New Mexico
Nonh Carolina
North Dakota
South Dakota
Washington
l깨oming

(1 2 states)
(Th is data is adaptedfrom the 1992 U. S. Departmellt ofHousing and Urban Developmellt swwnaη’.)

APPENDIX B
EMPLOYMENT IMPACT ON ENTERPRISE ZONE RESIDENTS
OF NINE PORTLAND
Name of
Business

First
Year

Nabisco
Blue Bell
CARCO
TYCO

1989
1990

TOTALS

1991
1992

New
Hires

EZ
Residents

Percent of
EZ Residents

Company
Emn10vees

Investment in
Millions 0 f$

45%
58%

546/14*

16.9
.7
4.5

168

75

174
25
129

101
10

40%

115

89%

496

301

61%

240
19**

130/0-200***

10.0

* Full timιpart-time
** Total has been a따'usted to account for turnover.
*** Full time/temporary 'emporary hires vary from 0 to 200)

“

EZ Bu찌nesses
Nabisco Incorporated is a biscuit bake，η plant, which produces cookies and crackers.
Blue Bell Potato Chip Company is a chips plant, which produces baked and fried snacks.
Columbia Aluminum Recycle Conψ'any (CARCO) is a recycler of aluminum.
TYCO Distribution Corporation is an international distributor of toys.
(πlis

data is adapted from 1993 information provided by the Portland Development Commission.)
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This single case study in Appendix B takes an important step forward in
researching some of the important issues raised in the national study. ’The data for
the North/ Northeast Portland Enterprise Zone provides information on the kinds and
sizes of EZ businesses , and on new hires who are zone residents. Most telling about
the data is that 61 % of all new hires are EZ residents. Nabisco Incorporated is a
large-size company with 45 % of 와I new hires who are EZ residents , Columbia
Aluminum Recycle Company (CARCO) is a small-size company with 40% , and Blue
Bell Potato Chip Company and TYCO Distribution Corporation are medium-size
companies with 58% and 89% respectively.

As you can see , the medium-size

companies have a great many new hires who are EZ residents. All of the firms are
in the industrial sector.
πIe

EZ program has had a positive impact on

y월따

exoanding these

companies. Nabisco is a biscuit bakery plant, which produces cookies and crackers ,
and has 560 total employees and 168 new hires (and 75 EZ residents who are new
hires) , with 43 % in growth of their labor force. Blue Bell is a chips plant, which
produces baked and fried snacks , 없띠 has 240 total employees and 174 new hires (and
101 EZ residents who are new hires) , with 235 % in growth of their labor force.
CARCO is a recyler of aluminum and has 19 total employees and 25 new hires due
to turnover (and 10 EZ residents are new hires) , with 280% in growth of their labor
force (at the 19 level). TYCO is an international toys distributor and has a varying
total of employees (1 30 to 330) , due to seasonal

ac디vity，

and has had tremendous
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growth of their labor force. (Additionally , Ann Sacks Tile is a small firm that is
projected to expand and participate in the EZ program in the next year or two , and
is projected to significantly invest and increase in new hires.)
In comparison between companies , the level of investment varies widely.

Nabisco 때d TYCO have made the largest investments of $16.9 million and $10
million respectively; and both of these companies have had large growth in their labor
forces. On the h없ld ， Blue Bell has made the smallest investment of $.7 million , yet
has had a large growth in their labor force; while CARCO has made a medium level
investment of $4.5 million , yet has had small growth in their labor force.
Again , these companies have had large expansions due to the EZ incentives.
Two noteworthy points are (1) that no companies have relocated into the EZ , as the
participating companies have

댄필웰쁘다

from within the EZ , and (2) that the type of

newly created EZ jobs are primarily blue collar.
The data in this case study on the participating businesses and residents in the
Portland EZ takes another step forward in analyzing the impact on employment. The
precise number of total new hires versus EZ residents newly hired is very valuable
to the field of policy research , and this type of data collection is necessary for a
thorough evaluation of any EZ program. Although , some fOlm of data collection is
mandated in

와130

of Oregon EZs , NINE Portland is the only EZ in Oregon that is

"mandated by the legislature to collect specific data on EZ residents."
Three important

charactelis디cs

of EZ legislation are (1) that for Portland , a
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minimum of 40 % of new hires must be EZ residents (detailed reporting and data
collecting are required and administered through the local EZ manager at the Portland
Development Commission); and (2) that there is a first source 피ring agreement with
a large job referral and training provider (which , for Portland , is the local JOB-NET
program with its large training network , including the federal Job Training
Partnership Act or JTPA program); and (3) that the legislation provides property tax
abatements for construction and renovation.
The Portland mandate on at least 40 % of new hires being EZ residents does
hinder many service sector businesses from developing , if the companies require
hig비y

skilled service workers. American Airlines is a firm that chose not to build

comp따ly 0댐ces

with 600 employees in the NINE Portland EZ , due to too many

obstacles , including the residential mandate. American Airlines wanted the legislature
to gr없It a waiver to drop the minimum new hire mandate to 30% ofEZ residents , so
that a large percentage of current employees could be relocated there. This difficult
issue along with other serious problems killed the deal. ’The manufacturing industry
with blue collar labor has had a much easier time 파탤다끄gand exceedin l! the new hire
mandate of EZ residents , due to the entry level and most common job (blue collar)
skills of EZ residents.

The minimum hire mandate in three other urban zones in Oregon is a 50 %
requirement, but this stipulation includes all of the residents in the metropolitan or
regional urban growth boundary. So , in essence , this mandate is very easy to meet.
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All other zones throughout the state , which are essentially rural , have no residency
mandates.
The first source hiring agreement in Portland is a model job referral

ini디때ve

for EZ programs. JOB-NET has 205 active affiliates , which are widely ranging in
organizational mission and scope , from the Oregon State Employment Division and
The Urban League of Portland to the Albina Ministerial Alliance and store front

churches. All types of social services are provided in the different affiliates including
job contacts , job training , job interviewing skills , and personal grooming as needed.
Although , the job referral service may be of greatest value to the EZ residents by
securing interviews for all new EZ jobs during the duration of the agreement.
Additionally , three metro-area community colleges participate in JOB-NET.
The special vocational and technical

tr외피ng

program at Portland Community

College , the EZ property tax incentive , and especially the State ’ s guar，없ltee of $50
m피ion 피

special revenue bonds (fmancial incentive) were elements in Pacific Air

Maintenance Corporation’ s (PAMCORP ’ s) decision in 1992 to build in Portland.
Portland competed with many other western cities for PAMCORP ’ s fleet repair and
maintenance of major airlines. Unfortunately , the airline industry as a whole has
recently experienced economic

없rd ψnes ，

operations after a short time and before

so PAMCORP had to close down
ge띠ng

their Portland company fully

established.

Another interesting element of this episode is that the Portland Airport area

157

was also annexed into the EZ , which was a major incentive for PAMCORP. The
administrative rules allow for property to be annexed , in proportion to the EZ area
(public property and wet land) that is unable to be developed. But residential areas
are not allowed to be annexed , so that any business annexation directly benefits EZ
residents and the first source hiring provider,

crea따19

a win-win situation for the

public-private partnership.
The property tax incentives are for new construction and renovation , so
medium and large-size business with major building ,
projects are the primary beneficiaries.

exp따~ion ，

and renovation

The property tax begins with an 100 %

abatement in year one and is phased out by 20 % decremental

따nounts

each year for

a five year total.
A qualified firm must increase its employment by 10% in the first year to be
eligible for the property tax incentive. If any qualified finn makes a $25 million or
more investment

때d 댈윌꼬~

its existing work force , then the 10%

m따ldate

on

increasing its work force is waived. Under special circumstances , this last provision
on investment can even apply to a firm that has a reduction in the work force.
Although the NINE Portland EZ has been very successful in the hiring of EZ
residents per new job created , the author’ s strong recommendation is that Oregon
should amend its current legislation to provide employer income tax incentives to
strengthen and broaden the program. The

author’ sna띠onal

study shows that both

property and income taxes for employers have a significant impact on employment,
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apparently due to the high dollar value contained in these tax incentives. In fact when
both property and income tax incentives are available , there is an immediate and
major impact on employment. A full-scale EZ program with many incentives , in
addition to property and income tax incentives , is best of all and should be adopted
by Oregon and all states serious about increasing economic development and
employment in poverty areas. This is especially true for small business , as more and
better economic incentives would increase its growth and participation in hiring EZ
residents.
Other incentives in a full-scale package could include personal income tax
credits for new hires who are employed through the first source training provider.
까lis

would serve as a supplemental

incen:디ve

to unemployed local residents along

with enhancing their job training providers. This would also assist with the personal
finances of the unemployed Portland residents in competing for

en따

level jobs with

the commuting Vancouver, Washington residents who would pay Oregon income
taxes.
A sales tax incentive in Oregon EZs is unnecessary , since Oregon does not
have a sales tax , except on a few items , such as hotel/motel lodging , gasoline ,
tobacco , and alcohol. Having no sales taxes is already an incentive for retail business
in Portland , as consumers from across the river in Washington State commute to
make pure없ses. However , the NINE Portland EZ boundary does not receive the
high retail volume , as do other Portland areas , so retail jobs tend to grow in these
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other areas. But having no sales taxes is also 때 incentive for Portland businesses that
make large purchases of equipment and supplies for production , and this does include
the NINE Portland EZ.
Actually , a sales tax incentive and EZ program in Vancouver, Washington is
greatly needed , as retail business in the downtown area has dwindled over the years ,
due to the competition from Portland (which has no sales tax) and the attraction of
large shopping malls. Retail businesses in downtown Vancouver are finding that
paying the sales tax for the customer , which is similar to a reduced sales price , has
increased the volume of retailing. In fact , the local newspaper has reported that the
Washington State Department of Revenue has estimated that the sales tax could be
reduced by about 3 % or more (한om 7.6% to about 4.6% or so) 피 Clark County , and
still maintain the current level of public revenues , due to the increased retail activity
of a lower sales tax by attracting the Vancouver residents who would otherwise shop
in Portland. More importantly , legislating (1) employer property tax abatements and
(2) employer income (Business

없ld

Occupations) tax credits would have a major

impact on employment as demonstrated by the author ’ s study. Again , a full-scale
incentives package , with property , income , and sales tax incentives among others
incentives , would be a redevelopment boom to this

urb따1

area.

Oregon EZs should be ready to apply for any available federal incentives , both
now and in the future. It may be difficult for an Oregon EZ to receive the income
tax incentives available to just 미ne federally-designated EZs in 1994-95. But the near
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future promises the creation of federally-sponsored community development banks ,
which should make available low interest loans to businesses in a great many EZs.
Oregon could also move forward with state-sponsored low interest loans to EZ
businesses , just as other states have done , to get a head start on combining state and
federal financial incentives. Due to the demographics , the NINE Portland EZ is the
most likely in Oregon to compete for and receive this type of federal incentive.
Two additional and important policy recommendations from this single case
study , which should be mandated by

fede때

and state legislatures are:

(1) that

specific data on all new job hires who are and are not zone residents be derived for
와I

EZ programs; and (2) that a job referral and

tr빼ng

network be provided for all

EZ programs. The first recommendation of deriving data on new jobs and zone
residents would contribute greatly to program evaluation.

Although secondary ,

demographic information on age , sex , ethnicity , income , education , household
dependents , and disability status would increase the knowledge of the impacts on
various zone residents. Also , data is needed on EZ business owners , investors , and
entrepreneurs in regard to assets (investment capital , earnings , equipment and
facilities) , type of industry (manufacturing , distributing , service and retailing) ,
productivity and the number of employees , and demographics (similar to the data
needed on zone residents) , which would enhance the knowledge of EZ outcomes.
Some of the annual data on the business investment dollars and the number of new
jobs in the state EZs are already derived by HUD.
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The second recommendation on providing referral and training networks would
enhance the hiring of zone residents for the newly created jobs. The job referral and
training provider networks in Portland and throughout Oregon constitute a model for
other states and localities to emulate.

Many businesses throughout the country

employ new hires through 파화댈퍼 employee/personal referrals and social networks ,
which can obviate the hiring of local residents. Thus , the 렐딱따 referral agreements
in Oregon supersede the conventional ways that employers seek out good job
applic때.ts.

EZ residents in Portland have benefitted greatly by this public-private

partnership with a job referral and job

tr없빼g

network.

In conclusion, this single case study is a landmark in beginning research on

specific employment outcomes of zone residents.

The 61 % employment of zone

residents for the new jobs is the most significant finding in evaluating the
North/ Northeast Portland EZ.

APPENDIX C
KEY QUESTIONS ON SURVEY
PART 1. LOCAL ZONE

CHARACTERIS πCS

AND PERFORMANCE

@웰따파 L

1.
2.
3.

Wha t is the name of the State-designated Enterprise Zone?
Wha t is the name of the c01rununi η in which the Zone is located?
Wh en W，따 the area designated as a State Emelprise Zone? (month/day/year)
Socio-Demogn αphic

5.
6.

Data on Communi η and Zone:
At Designation
C끼rrent
Zo쁘 Cαnmunitv
갈쁘 Communitv

Population
% Unemployment
Land Use:

10.
11.

How many square miles in the designated Zone?
How is land used in the Zone?
Percent of Land in Zone
a. Residential
b. Commercial
c. Industrial
d. Open Space
e. Other

(This appendix is adaptedfrom Pan 1, Page 3, ofthe survey instrument used by the ι S. Departme1lf
ofHousing and Urban Development. Please note that some ofthe questio1lS have been skipped in the
adaptation, due to irrelevancy or incompletion in the data base.)

